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THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CASES:
A CRITICISM OF JUDICIAL METHOD
by Karl M. Manheim*
I. INTRODUCTION
The eighth amendment' prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishments. In a society where criminal laws and processes have been
highly visible aspects of social development, one would have expected
early and periodic pronouncements on the reach of this proscription.
Yet, eighth amendment jurisprudence has not, until recently, been very
extensive. The lack of reference to the eighth amendment in constitu-
tional litigation has been most surprising in the area of capital punish-
ment. This problem has not resulted from neglect, but from the fact
that capital punishment has historically been assumed to be necessary
and appropriate in dealing with serious offenses. Except for scattered
cases involving unconscionable or unique sentences, the eighth amend-
ment has emerged only from desuetude during this decade.
The Supreme Court has traditionally approached the issue of capital
punishment with reluctance and caution. Recent death penalty ad-
judications have been further marked by unusual differences in meth-
odology among the Justices. Efforts at deriving a unitary principle
concerning the constitutional status of capital punishment have re-
sulted in uncertainty in this area. In fact, some have seen the most
recent capital cases as contradictory to the requirements which had pre-
viously evolved.2 A majority of the Court has declined to prohibit
capital punishment as a sanction per se inconsistent with the eighth
amendment. Instead, death penalties may be constitutionally meted
out in cases involving homicide. Furthermore, sentencing procedures
must fall somewhere between vesting the sentencing body with stan-
dardless discretion and removing all such discretion through the use of
automatic sentencing. Other instances in which the death penalty may
be imposed will likely appear on a case by case basis.
This article explores the development of judicial method in capital
* B.S., 1971 (Bradley University); J.D., 1974 (Northeastern University); LL.M., 1978
(Harvard University). Visiting Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. See note 245 infra and accompanying text.
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cases since 1971. Its structure consists of a chronological discussion of
the leading cases. It is critical of the Court's continuing reticence to
develop coherent standards and what appears to be the absence of en-
during principles. In the capital cases, most of the justices have ad-
hered to a theory of judicial review which relies heavily on legislative
judgment and popular sentiment. The Court should instead take a
more expansive role in interpreting the meaning of "cruel and unu-
sual," to the point of exercising moral leadership in this controversial
area.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY PER SE:
FURmAN v GEoRGm
The death penalty is not proscribed explicitly in the Constitution.
Indeed, it is implicitly condoned in several passages.' As a result, chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of capital punishment must be based
upon the fifth and fourteenth amendment4 guarantees of due process or
upon the ambiguous wording of the eighth amendment guarantee
against cruel and unusual punishment. Prior to Furman v. Georgia,5 the
constitutionality of the death penalty per se was never addressed in a
United States Supreme Court decision. Instead, most attacks on partic-
ular death sentences were directed at the convictions themselves or at
the sentencing procedures. In those few challenges which raised the va-
lidity of a death sentence, it was the mode of execution, rather than the
fact of execution, which was considered. For example, in In re
Kemmler,6 the Supreme Court rejected a substantive due process chal-
lenge to electrocution as an inhumane method of executing a death sen-
tence.7
In Furman,' five of the nine separate opinions found the death pen-
alty, as applied to Furman, unconstitutional. 9 Justices Brennan and
Marshall each dealt with the facial constitutionality of capital punish-
ment directly, finding it violative of the eighth amendment. However,
3. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital...
crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ......
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
6. 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (death by electrocution not "cruel and unusual").
7. Id at 447. Accord, Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1946) (failure to electrocute
prisoner on first attempt would constitute "cruel and unusual" punishment only if inten-
tional). See also Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) (death sentence by hanging or firing
squad not erroneous).
8. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
9. See, eg., Justice Blackmun's dissent in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 405.
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opinions by Justices Stewart, White, and Douglas all pursued an ana-
lytic approach and found that procedural due process safeguards were
deficient in the sentencing schemes under review. Thus, two basic ap-
proaches toward eighth amendment interpretation emerged from
Furman: the analytic approach and the normative approach.
A. The Analytic Approach
The methodology pursued by Justices Stewart, White, and Douglas
in Furman has been labeled as the analytic approach.10 It has the
eighth amendment derive principle meaning from other explicit consti-
tutional guarantees such as due process and equal protection. Accord-
ingly, the eighth amendment would require that personal guarantees
found elsewhere in the text of the Constitution be applied with particu-
lar exactitude when severe punishments are involved. In this vein, Jus-
tices White and Stewart found the Furman capital statutes to be
arbitrary and capricious in their application.Y" Justice Douglas further
found that the statutes permitted discriminatory application in viola-
tion of the equal protection clause.
12
Where used in the capital punishment cases, the analytic approach
10. Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 1,
10 [hereinafter cited as Polsby]. See also Sarat & Vidmar, Public Opinion, he Death Penalty
and the Eighth Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 171, 172
[hereinafter cited as Sarat & Vidmar].
11. 408 U.S. at 308-11.
12. Id at 249. However, capital sentencing which violates equal protection either can be
theoretically rectified without resort to the eighth amendment or is endemic to the criminal
process. In the first case, fourteenth amendment guarantees of equal protection could be
invoked to prevent discrimination in sentencing. Accord, Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138,
148 (8th Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 398 U.S. 262 (1970). In Maxwell, the Court
recognized that discretion exists at all stages of a criminal prosecution. To fully remove such
discretion might unreasonably impede the criminal justice system. Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 199-204 (1976).
A study to be published shortly by Professor William Bowers of Northeastern University
concludes that the death penalty continues to be meted out in a rare, arbitrary, and discrimi-
natory manner.
In cases of murder or felonious homicide, the Bowers study reveals that the killer of a
white man is six times more likely to be sentenced to death than the killer of a black
man. The study further shows that a black who kills a white is 50 times more likely to
receive a death sentence than a white who kills a black.
NORTHEASTERN TODAY, June 1978, at I.
See also Lehtinen, he Value of Lffe; An Argument for the Death Penalty, 23 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 237 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Lehtinen], which suggests that procedural
safeguards, not eighth amendment prohibitions, would correct discriminatory executions.
However, Lehtinen cautions: "A system designed to apply the death penalty nondis-
criminatorily would probably execute a far greater number of [men, blacks, ignorant, and
poor], simply because the crimes that call for execution are most frequently committed by
them." Id at 247.
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does not appear well defined. In the area of criminal punishment, anal-
ysis under the due process clauses will often overlap eighth amendment
analysis. The Supreme Court has done little to distinguish reasoning
under one from reasoning under the other. In fact, in Furman, Justice
Powell commented: "Whether one views the question as one of due
process or cruel and unusual punishment, as I do for convenience in
this case, the issue is essentially the same." 3
However, the issues raised by the eighth amendment and the due
process clause are not the same, and loose analysis of these guarantees
has caused the Court some trouble. In Robinson v. California,14 for the
first time, the Court extended the eighth amendment's applicability di-
rectly to the states, thereby limiting state determinations of criminality.
At the very least, this incorporation suggests that the eighth amend-
ment offers protections not immediately found within fourteenth
amendment notions of due process. The interplay between due process
and eighth amendment analysis leaves any principled approach in this
area confusing at best. In McGautha v. Calfornia,15 the Court held that
neither strict sentencing standards nor bifurcated trials in capital cases
were required by the due process clause. A year later, however, Furman
implicitly overruled McGautha. Furman and McGautha were later dis-
tinguished on the ground that Furman was an eighth amendment deci-
sion whereas MeGautha relied solely on the due process clause.1
6
The confusing interplay between these constitutional protections is
also found in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's capital judg-
ment case, Commonwealth v. O'Neal.'7 In the leading opinion, Chief
Justice Tauro relied on both the due process and cruel and unusual
punishment clauses of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights: "This
dual analysis is possible here where these two concepts are 'so close as
to merge' because the 'due process argument reiterates what is essen-
tially the primary purpose of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause ... ."'I8 Yet, two pages later Chief Justice Tauro stated that a
decision based on due process would have no bearing on the constitu-
13. 408 U.S. at 429 (Powell, J., dissenting).
14. 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding a statute which made the status of narcotic addiction a
criminal offense imposed "cruel and unusual" punishment).
In Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1942), Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion
found that the concept of ordered liberty in the due process clause itself "expresses a de-
mand for civilized standards" in punishment. Id at 468 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
15. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
16. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195-96 n.47 (1976).
17. 339 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. 1975).
18. Id at 677.
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tionality of capital punishment under the cruel and unusual test.19
In response to Furman v. Georgia, and the procedural defects which
highlighted the analytic approach, state legislatures developed tighter
and procedurally more acceptable sentencing schemes. In 1976, in
Gregg v. Georgia,2" the Court was again presented with a per se chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of capital punishment. This time, a ma-
jority of the Court found the procedural guarantees which were lacking
in Furman21 to be properly safeguarded and, accordingly, let Georgia's
capital statute stand.
In a 1977 case, Gardner v. Florida, the Supreme Court invalidated a
death sentence where the trial judge relied, in part, on a confidential
presentence report which had not been revealed to the defense. Justice
Stevens' opinion for the Court relied exclusively on the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, although Justice White, concur-
ring, would have employed a narrower eighth amendment analysis to
find the sentence unconstitutional. Justice White's analytic approach
would require the sentencing judge to reveal such reports only where a
sentence of death was possible. Consequently, the eighth amendment
is essential to the analytic method only in that independent constitu-
tional guarantees, such as due process, apply with greater force in capi-
tal cases.23
Eighth amendment analysis as due process analysis does find schol-
arly support. An article by Professor Angel24 suggests that substantive
due process has reemerged in criminal law. But Professor Angel's
thrust is that the judicial methodology is that of substantive due process
19. Chief Justice Tauro's due process analysis is rather short, finding that insofar as "life
is a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution," the state
must show a compelling governmental need to extinguish it; which it fails to do. But while
endeavoring to "clarify the relationship between these two lines of analysis," the opinion
does not do so. Id at 679.
20. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
21. See, e.g., Justice Blackmun's dissent in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 405.
22. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
23. A procedure for selecting people for the death penalty which permits consideration
of such secret information relevant to the "character and record of the individual of-
fender,". . . fails to meet the "need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment" which the Court indicated was required in Woodson [v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)]. This conclusion stems solely from the Eighth Amend-
ment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments on which the Woodron decision ex-
pressly rested, and my conclusion is limited, as was Woodson, to cases in which the
death penalty is imposed.
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. at 364 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. at 304, 305).
24. Angel, Substantive Due Process and the Criminal Law, 9 LoY. CHI. L.J. 61, 74 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Angel].
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and not necessarily that the eighth amendment has no vitality of its
own. Nonetheless, she explains the recent capital punishment cases us-
ing the "means-ends" analysis of substantive due process. 25
Despite the fact that the analytic approach gained prominence in
Furman and has been used intermittently since then, it is clear that
procedural due process is insufficient to insure that the eighth amend-
ment proscriptions on inhumane punishments will be observed.
The very fact that the eighth amendment proscription of cruel and unu-
sual punishment is in the Constitution ought to condemn reliance on due
process alone. If an individual were afforded every procedural considera-
tion, duly convicted of a crime and then burned at the stake, we would
agree that his rights had not been "sufficiently" protected.
26
Accordingly, it appears that an analytic approach to the eighth amend-
ment denies the independent protection of that amendment. This ap-
proach falls short in several key places and impedes the development of
standards for punishments.
B. The Normative Approach
The normative approach recognizes the eighth amendment as an in-
dependent proscription of inhumane punishments. It finds its meaning
"not in other provisions of the Constitution but in the fundamental val-
ues which underlie the Constitution as a whole."'27 Polsby labeled this
the normative approach because those who employ it seek to formulate
standards which originate from outside the written law.28
Normative eighth amendment analysis first appeared in Weems v.
United States.29 There the Court refused to accept an interpretation of
the eighth amendment which would invalidate only those punishments
rejected at the time the amendment was adopted. Instead, the meaning
of "cruel and unusual" was tied to the maturing ethical values of soci-
ety: "The clause of the Constitution in the opinion of the learned com-
mentators may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlight-
25. Professor Angel states that the Gardner Court's reference to Furman as "due process"
authority is a retreat from eighth amendment language in favor of "substantive due process"
reasoning. See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 359 (Marshall, J., concurring).
26. Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penal y Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L.
REv. 1773, 1802 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg & Dershowitz].
27. Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 10, at 173.
28. Polsby, supra note 10. See also Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 10, at 174.
29. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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ened by a humane justice."3
In Trop v. Dulles,3 the Court reiterated this proposition: "The
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
3 2
The normative approach is basically an effort to develop a set of in-
dependent standards which aid in the fluid interpretation of "cruel and
unusual." Those words are probably more than a "collection point for
other, established constitutional theories. ' 33 Additionally, it is doubt-
ful that they prohibit only those punishments in disfavor at the time the
Bill of Rights was adopted.34
The proposition of a static eighth amendment no longer seems tena-
ble, particularly in light of the development of normative analysis since
Weems.3 1 Cases following Furman have generally applied analyses de-
rived from a normative approach. Standards peculiar to the eighth
amendment have been used primarily to reject the imposition of the
death penalty for rape.36 The normative approach was also used to con-
clude that the eighth amendment does not prohibit capital punishment
in all circumstances.
30. Id at 378. The Court spoke also of the evolutionary character of the Constitution in
general
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experience
of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the
form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new
conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth.
Id at 373.
31. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
32. Id at 101.
33. Polsby, supra note 10, at 10.
34. However, Chief Justice Burger does suggest this historical interpretation in Furman:
"The records... show that the framers' exclusive concern was the absence of any ban on
tortures. . . ." 408 U.S. at 376-77. Professor Malcolm Wheeler refutes this interpretation:
The framers must have intended that the eighth amendment would be applicable to
new punishments never considered during the eighteenth century. It follows that there
must be principles by which we can determine whether any new punishment violates
the eighth amendment. The logical way to derive such tests is to ask what principles led
the framers to be concerned with certain methods of torture .... It seems rather clear
that the reason for adopting specific historical language is to adopt the results or princi-
ples which underlie it.
Wheeler, To ward a Theory of Limited Punishment 1; The Eighth Amendment After Furman v.
Georgia, 25 STAN. L. REV. 62, 63-64 n.7 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Wheeler - II]. See also
Black, The Bill ofRights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960): "[It is not the case that] our ultimate
constitutional freedoms are no more than our English ancestors had when they came to this
new land to get new freedoms." Id at 867.
35. However, Justice Rehnquist may not be ready to abandon this theory. See Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 308 (1976). (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
36. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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But the analytic approach has not disappeared. It was specifically
invoked in the mandatory cases37 and recently in Lockett v. Ohio38
where Justice Blackmun, concurring, found fifth and sixth amendment
infirmities in petitioner's death sentence. These occasional applications
of the analytic method, however, are generally supplemental to the
broader normative approach. Accordingly, the Court has settled on an
interpretation of the eighth amendment which reflects the Weems and
Trop analysis: that "cruel and unusual" derives its meaning from the
"evolving standards of decency." Just how those standards are divined
is still the major issue in eighth amendment adjudication.
III. ESTABLISHING STANDARDS FOR "CRUEL AND UNUSUAL"
The majority in Gregg v. Georgia" chose to seek external and "objec-
tive" evidence of the evolving standards of decency upon which to base
constitutional principles. These factors include historic usage, legisla-
tion, public opinion, and jury conduct. By using such external factors,
these Justices rejected a reliance on personal moral feelings in estab-
lishing norms for humane punishment.
Previously, in Furman, at least five Justices had found the penalty to
be repugnant to their personal moral beliefs. Yet, three of the five,
Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Burger, had refrained from "judicial
activism" by adhering to conventional presumptions of legislative va-
lidity. This highly deferential approach prevailed in Gregg. These
Justices perceived a problem no less significant than that of institu-
tional legitimacy; to link "non-democratic" judicial review to public
consent in some way." Professor Tribe, in his treatise on constitutional
law, states: "This point of view, then, seeks to reduce the role of judges
in the process of constitutional review by holding judges to a method of
reasoning which as much as possible moves from constitutional text to
the result in the case at hand without intervening value judgments."'4'
In the death penalty cases, this jurisprudence predominates. For in-
37. See notes 211-82 infra and accompanying text.
38. 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978).
39. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
40. See Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power. The Ethical Function of
Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 689 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Perry],
The legitimacy of the power ofjudicial review is essentially an antiquarian issue ....
[It is] however, not altogether without contemporary significance. The degree of ease
with which one justifies judicial review - especially in functional terms, as an aspect of
the political theory of American democracy - can affect one's stand on the fundamen-
tal issue of American constitutional law: the proper scope of judicial review.
Id at 707-08.
41. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 48 (1978) [hereinafter cited as L. TRIBE].
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stance, in Furman, Chief Justice Burger stated that "constitutional in-
quiry. . . must be divorced from personal feelings as to the morality
and efficacy of the death penalty."
42
Of course, reference to objective evidence of public values is not new
with the death penalty cases. Former Justice Goldberg and Professor
Dershowitz recalled that the due process analyses of Justices Cardozo
and Frankfurter similarly eschewed subjective value judgments.
"Rather, they interpreted the [due process] clause to protect only those
values which were in fact generally accepted and adhered to. As an
index of constitutional protection, the Court tended to rely upon objec-
tive idicia of attitudes actually prevailing in society." 43 Also permeat-
ing our history of substantive due process is first a denial of and then a
retreat from subjective principles in constitutional law. Avoiding "sub-
jectivism" is suggested by some to be the major task of the Court in all
cases.' Images of the Lochner era are conjured up whenever the
Supreme Court seems to grope for a natural rights solution to a non-
textually based constitutional issue. Today there is an obvious avoid-
ance of the economic due process methodology of the late 19th and
early 20th centuries. This is apparent in many of the penumbra cases,
such as those which recognize fundamental rights of privacy and family
relations.45
42. 408 U.S. at 375.
43. Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 26, at 1799. See also Repouille v. United States,
165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947). In Repouile, Judge Learned Hand, in considering the Nation-
ality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C. § 707(a)(3), determined that the phrase 'good moral character'
• . . set as a test, not those standards which we might ourselves approve, but whether 'the
moral feelings, now prevalent generally in this country' would 'be outraged' by the conduct
in question: that is, whether it conformed to 'the generally accepted moral conventions cur-
rent at the time."' Id at 153. But see note 87 infra and text accompanying.
44. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Princioles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1959).
45. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Justice Douglas expanded the rea-
soning behind Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923), while at the same time avoiding the charge that the Court was "fashioning
constitutional law out of the Justices' personal preferences." Wellington, Notes on
Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 287 (1973). Justice Douglas had also applied an analytic
approach in Griswold by denying any meaning to "due process" independent of other consti-
tutional provisions.
Just as Meyer and Pierce had established "first principles" of constitutional law, so, to
some extent, had cases such as Griswold and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), thereby
firmly establishing the "right of privacy" as a fundamental constitutional guarantee. Profes-
sor Perry has suggested that the Court should engage in ethical leadership. He also states
that morally based cases may rest upon previous cases which established "first principles" of
conventional morality. He cites Griswold and Roe as taking this approach. Perry, supra
note 40, at 730. However, not all cases requiring non-textual adjudication can rest upon
previous "first principles." Some of these cases must establish those principles, as did Meyer
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A discomfort with subjectivism appears in many of the death penalty
opinions.46 There is an obvious tension between the desire to find neu-
tral principles underlying the eighth amendment and the Court's con-
stitutional task to render judgments on the validity of penalty
legislation.47 The alliance between normative values and public moral-
ity, beginning with Weems4" and Trop4 9 and continuing to the present,
has been an effort to resolve this conflict. This view employs the eighth
amendment as authority for the Supreme Court to engage in a compre-
hensive analysis of societal attitudes on criminality and punishments.50
Personal beliefs of the Justices are useful at the extremes but otherwise
should not be considered unless consistent with broad based social val-
ues.
The current version of the normative approach, which relies on pop-
ular values, does not fully implement eighth amendment protections
and cannot be applied faithfully in all cases.51 Moreover, before ana-
lyzing how the Justices in fact objectively determine popular values, it
is useful to ask how a particular Justice will know when his views di-
verge from the public's views. Deference to legislative judgment 52 is
not the only question. That is a relatively easy analytic task. Usually
the Justices' personal moral beliefs will not be so different from the
public's as to enable clear differentiation. And to what extent do the
Justices themselves comprise a part of the relevant public such that
their own beliefs are indicative of general attitudes?
Professor Perry53 suggests that even in the substantive due process
cases the Justices merely reflect conventional morality:
It bears special emphasis that each Justice is but part of the Court-as-jury.
and Pierce. The competency and legitimacy of the Court to establish those principles in the
first instance is in need of resolution. See notes 64-66 infra and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("We
should not allow our personal preferences as to the wisdom of legislative and congres-
sional action, or our distate for such action, to guide our judicial decision in cases such
as these.").
47. The Supreme Court has never denied its ultimate responsibility to render judgment
on the constitutionality of the death penalty. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597
(1977).
48. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
49. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
50. See section IV infra.
51. See notes 224-27 infra and accompanying text. See also Tao, Beyond Furman v. Geor-
gia: The Needfor a Morally Based Decision on Capital Punishment, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW.
722, 736:
[R]eference to the "democratic process" does not contribute to a decisive solution. Leg-
islators, in any case, are ill-equipped to announce and elaborate on first moral princi-
ples. Accordingly, the Supreme Court not only seems most fit to solve the problem on
moral grounds in the context of the Constitution, but will find it difficult again to evade
the issue of the intrinsic value of capital punishment.
52. See section IV(B) infra.
53. Perry, supra note 40.
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Even if, in mapping the contours of the public morals, one or more mem-
bers of the Court are seriously out of touch with conventional moral cul-
ture - or one or more members practice studied disingenuity in assaying
that culture - it is unlikely that a majority of the Court will'be similarly
out of touch or disingenuous. In this quite crucial sense, the contribution
of each Justice to the collective evaluation of conventional moral culture
is subject to a significant corrective check. 4
As noted above," at least five of the Justices in Furman56 stated that
the current capital statutes were repugnant to their personal beliefs. Is
it possible that they are so out of touch with community standards as to
discount their own judgments?
5 7
The judicial process is not divorced completely from the political
process, and appointed Justices are normally representative of the
relevant public.5" "The Justices, after all, are not unfamiliar with con-
ventional mores and attitudes; in truth it is unlikely that a very uncon-
ventional person would become a Justice of the Supreme Court."5 9
Professor Tribe also questions conceptions of the Supreme Court as
aloof and indifferent to contemporary political issues. "The process of
appointment, however, is entirely political, and the sometimes quite
rapid turnover in the Supreme Court's membership suggests that the
federal judiciary may be more capable of adapting to changes in the
political consensus than the notion of an independent judiciary would
immediately suggest."6
Yet, the Justices are in a position removed from the political pres-
sures of the legislative process and perhaps are more able to keep at-
tuned to the public morals. Even if the moral issues before the Court
did not require an anti-majoritarian institutional framework, such as
that suited for adjudication of political and civil rights issues, the politi-
cal responsiveness of legislatures may render them "too close to the
action" to accurately assess general cultural attitudes. The Supreme
Court may be insulated from political pressures, but it is not isolated
54. Id. at 732 n.201.
55. See notes 39-42 supra and accompanying text.
56. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
57. See also Greenwalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 398
(1975): "[lit can be argued that on many issues a judge might assume that if his values are
far wide of community standards, he will be outvoted by his brethren or reversed by a
higher court."
58. Perhaps this is not the case of the public at large, but it is at least representative of that
portion which has political influence. See Perry, supra note 40, at 717.
59. Id at 730.
60. L. TRim, supra note 41, at 49-50.
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from the ethical norms of contemporary culture.61 "The Court...
sensitized by constitutional decision making and insulated from the ob-
scuring political pressures and expediencies of the moment, is admira-
bly situated to observe and to sense the evolution of contemporary
moral culture."
62
Not only are the courts well equipped to engage in the moral debate,
the constitution forces that task upon them. The eighth amendment
itself might be said to provide authority for the Court to independently
develop normative values regarding "cruel and unusual."
Much of our substantive constitutional doctrine is of this kind. Where it
arises "under" some piece of constitutional text, the text is not invoked as
the source of the values or principles that rule the cases. Rather the broad
textual provisions are seen as sources of legitimacy for judicial develop-
ment and explication of basic shared national values.
63
Thus, certain constitutional provisions, themselves absent of explicit or
normative values, can be seen as authority for the development of such
values. The public welfare limit on the police power may support this
particular judicial method.' The ninth amendment 6 might also pro-
vide authority for this approach.6 In cases such as Roe, the Court is
clearly using either the ninth amendment or the due process clause to
look beyond the "constitutional text for the content of. . .substantive
principles."67
In his dissent in Repouille v. United States,68 Judge Frank stated that
he was inclined to find "moral conventions [in the] attitudes of our ethi-
cal leaders."69 Others have also suggested that determining the public
morality requires reference to the "best minds of our age"; 70 lest there
be a general decline in the standards of justice.
The function of the Justices ... is to immerse themselves in the tradi-
tion of our society and of kindred societies that have gone before, in his-
tory and in the sediment of history which is law, and, as Judge Hand once
suggested, in the thought and the vision of the philosophers and the poets.
61. Perry, supra note 40, at 728.
62. Id at 728-29.
63. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 709 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Grey].
64. Perry, supra note 40, at 720.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
66. Black, The Un1 nished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REV. 3, 36 (1970).
67. Grey, supra note 63, at 709. The approach taken by Justice Blackmun in Roe is dras-
tically different from the approach he advocates in the capital punishment cases.
68. 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947).
69. Id at 154. See also the approach of Justice Blackmun in Roe, discussed in note 91
infra.
70. G. GOTrLIEB, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 15 (1967) [hereinafter cited as G. GOTTLIEB].
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The Justices will then be fit to extract "fundamental presuppositions"
from their deepest selves, but in fact from the evolving morality of our
tradition.71
Perhaps it is this jurisprudence which legitimates the Court's establish-
ment of first moral principles, on those few occasions when it has iisked
to do S0.72
Recognition of the Constitution as an organic repository of rights and
limitations, one which progresses with social evolution, necessarily in-
volves a broader judicial function than one which merely would have
the Court apply textually based values. Thus, Supreme Court language
which refers to enlightened public opinion73 or "evolving standards of
decency" 74 is an attempt to validate judicial inquiry beyond the four
corners of the document. However, instead of employing subjective
standards of decency, the Justices nominally search for objective in-
dicators of social moral values.
IV. OBJECTIVE INDICIA OF THE "EVOLVING STANDARDS OF
DECENCY"
A. Historic Usage
A great deal of superficial argument derives from the fact that capital
punishment was widely in use in 1789 and therefore was approved by
the framers. Yet, as will be developed later, "cruel and unusual" de-
mands the most humane alternatives and permits only those punish-
ments which are necessary to achieve legitimate governmental interests.
Such was the case at the time eighth amendment was adopted with
respect to serious crimes.
How could anyone in 1790 sensibly have demanded that the "evolving
standards of decency" require there and then imprisonment rather than
death for felons? There were no prisons, no trained custodial and admin-
istrative officers, no parole systems, no statutes to authorize creating any
of these, no public disposition to obtain them - in short, none of the
attitudes, facilities, and personnel obviously necessary to run a system of
long-term incarceration.
5
Flogging and banishment were also widely used punishments at the
71. Perry, supra note 40, at 731 n.196 (quoting A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 236 (1962)).
72. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
73. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
74. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
75. H. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 14
(1977) [hereinafter cited as H. BEDAU].
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time of ratification. Today these have been explicitly disapproved.76
This does not mean to suggest that historical usage has no signifi-
cance. It is safe to assume that all punishments used previously in Eng-
land which had been abandoned in America are per se
unconstitutional. 77 Professor Wheeler suggests that this category in-
cludes all forms of capital punishment involving additional corporal
punishment because "no such modes of capital punishment were au-
thorized in 1789 in the United States. '78 But this analysis does not rule
out new methods of punishment such as electrocution.79
In Furman, Justice Marshall observed: "In light of the meager [con-
stitutional] history that does exist, one would suppose that an innova-
tive punishment would probably be constitutional if no more cruel than
that punishment which it superseded." 0
Existence of the death penalty since America's founding does not per
se validate continued use of capital punishment. However, the history
of the death penalty does aid in understanding the "evolving standards
of decency" to be applied to a constitutional test. Furthermore, the
general history of punishment and the social response thereto are
equally relevant.
B. Legislation
One of the principal measures of public values, according to the
Court in Gregg, is the scope of morals legislation. Because of its repre-
sentative character, the legislature has sole responsibility for determin-
ing whether a law is decent or acceptable in terms of community
values."' This is particularly true with respect to the criminal law. In
Powell v. Texas,"2 the Court stated that the criminal law reflected the
community's "cultural taboos" and cautioned against the Court's be-
coming "the ultimate arbiter of the standards of criminal responsibility,
in diverse areas of the criminal law, throughout the country. 83
76. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (eighth amendment forbids expatriation as punish-
ment for crime); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1968) (use of straps on prisoners
held "cruel and unusual" under eighth amendment).
77. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 330 (Marshall, J., concurring).
78. Wheeler - II, supra note 34, at 66.
79. Eg., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (electrocution held not "cruel and unu-
sual").
80. 408 U.S. at 331.
81. H. BEDAU & C. PIERCE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (1976).
82. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
83. Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 26, at 1801 n.123. But see Robinson v. California,




Determining public morality through existing legislation presents an
unusual problem. The analysis here is more searching than customary
deference to legislation; it encompasses a two-step approach. Not only
is the particular capital statute under scrutiny given the normal pre-
sumption of validity, punishment statutes in general are canvassed to
identify a moral consensus, if one exists. While this comparison is usu-
ally made on a national level, reference has been made to international
opinion.s4 As a result, local standards of justice will not prevail if they
are at odds with overwhelming practice elsewhere.85
By using legislative enactments in general as an indicator of public
morality, the Court, in essence, defers to the collective legislatures for
their judgments on this social issue. The Court is implying that either
because of institutional competence or because of the political nature of
this process itself, the legislatures are more appropriately suited to
make determinations regarding public morality. "The paucity of judi-
cial decisions invalidating legislatively prescribed punishments is pow-
erful evidence that in this country, legislatures have in fact been
responsive - albeit belatedly at times - to changes in social attitudes
and moral values." 6
Institutional competence, as opposed to institutional legitimacy, is a
function of the science of lawmaking. Deference on this ground pre-
supposes that, for a variety of reasons, one branch of government is
better equipped to make laws than another. The legislature does a su-
perior job because of the tools and facilities available to it, the way the
body is constituted, and its experience in similar matters. Thus, defer-
ence on matters capable of empirical study, such as economic and so-
cial issues, is logical because, if for no other reason, the legislature can
and does consider evidence beyond the ken of judges.
[T]he legislature is, or at least can be, a better fact-finding body than an
appellate court. The greater number of members and their varied back-
grounds and experience make it virtually certain that the typical legisla-
ture will command wider knowledge and keener appreciation of current
social and economic conditions than will the typical court.
8 7
An appellate court's only structural equivalent of the committee
hearing is the use of detailed "Brandeis" briefs. For instance, Furman
was especially noteworthy for the way in which complex and varied
social science evidence had been presented in the briefs. Those briefs
84. Cf. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977).
85. See note 234 infra.
86. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 384 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
87. Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 199,
209 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Cox].
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certainly provided the bases for portions of the plurality opinions. 88
While this approach may provide information or evidence, there re-
main structural impediments to its widespread use. Professor Cox has
cautioned that "even in skilled hands, [the Brandeis brief] hardly
equips a court to decide which side is right about a highly controversial
social or economic question - assuming that 'rightness' can be
proved." 9 But herein lies the distinction between economic and social
matters on the one hand and issues involving contemporary morals on
the other. The special expertise of legislatures in areas of social and
economic policy does not necessarily carry over to issues of public mo-
rality.
90
Morals legislation in general presents a peculiar problem of institu-
tional competence. To the extent that factual issues are present, such as
the deterrent effects of certain punishments, bodies which are more ca-
pable of dealing with empirical evidence should normally be entrusted
with initial responsibility. However, where the regulating of public
morality is involved, a different type of competence is required. As
Professor Tribe suggests, fundamental moral conflicts may be beyond
the competence of the polity to resolve.91
Natural law theories of legal philosophy have insisted that there be
some conceptual link between law and morals. On the other hand, le-
88. H. BEDAU, supra note 75, at 91.
89. Cox, supra note 87, at 209.
90. See Perry, supra note 40, at 729:
The point is simply that the Court need not be paralyzed by self-doubt about its institu-
tional ability to determine accurately the contours of the public morals. The Court, as it
inquires whether a legislative act serves the public morals, need not assume the same
highly deferential posture that it takes toward matters of social and economic policy. In
the area of social and economic policy not only are social conventions by and large
settled, but the legislature has a special expertise; neither of these observations holds
true with respect to many issues in the public morals.
91. Justice Blackmun seems to have adopted this structure in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), where he was unwilling to defer to the legislatures' competence in forming judgments
on the issue of abortions. In Roe, Justice Blackmun invoked, inter alia, classical philoso-
phers, the ALI Model Penal Code, the American Medical Association, the American Public
Health Association, and the American Bar Association as enlightening authority indicating
that the Texas abortion statute violated substantive due process. The legislative consensus
on abortions was rejected in view of the "relative weights of the respective interests involved,
...the lessons and examples of medical and legal history,... the lenity of the common
law, and.., the demands of the profound problems of the present day." Id at 165.
The decision in Roe has drawn significant criticism. For instance, John Hart Ely has
suggested that the Court had no authority to consider "a question the Constitution has not
made the Court's business." Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 943 (1973). See also Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Roe: "The Court's opin-
ion.., is far more appropriate to a legislative judgment than to a judicial one." 410 U.S. at
173. Justice Blackmun was not similarly disposed in the death penalty cases. See Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
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gal positivism has stressed their conceptual separability. This is not to
deny that moral ideas influence and shape legal norms. Indeed, eighth
amendment analysis is nominally based on underlying moral stand-
ards. But this approach does dissuade the judge from applying his own
moral philosophies to these constitutional concepts.92
In Furman, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, in their dissent-
ing opinions, contended that the moral sentiments and beliefs of the
public were embodied in the various legislative enactments.9 3 This ver-
sion of legal positivism required a reference to "objective indicia" of
contemporary values. In this case, the indicia were partially embodied
in the statutes under attack. The overwhelming legislative response to
Furman - a renewal of capital legislation by over two thirds of the
states - was seen as compelling evidence of the current public morality
and a validation of the approach taken by the dissenters in Furman.94
Thus, legislative enactments are seen by most of the Justices as read-
ily available indicators of public morality. But they are not conclusive,
and in that sense the level of deference to legislative judgment is quali-
fied.95
C. Direct Measurement of Public Opinion
The Court's reference to general public opinion has probably caused
the greatest controversy. Simply stated, how does the Court structure
this measurement? Through the use of popularity polls? By analysis of
local referenda and state constitutional amendments?9  In a pluralistic
92. Professor H.L.A. Hart states that the separation of law and morals, even as an adjunct
to the moral criticism of law, is a characteristic of the English legal system. See Richards,
Rules, Policies and Neutral Principles. The Searchfor Legitimacy in Common Law and Consti-
tutionalAdjudication, 11 GEORGIA L. REv. 1069, 1112 (1977). American legal structures, on
the other hand, such as constitutional adjudication and judicial supremacy, are better ex-
plained by natural law jurisprudence. "Since the judiciary is thus still a lively focus for
moral reform, and indeed enforces and vindicates a charter of morally based constitutional
principles, positivism is not, for Americans, a necessary useful adjunct to moral reform." Id
at 1114.
Perhaps Hart's description accurately explains the Court's moral activism in the family
and abortion cases, see notes 45 & 91 supra and accompanying text, but it did not fairly
predict the response to capital punishment challenges. However, Hart's description does
suggest that the Court's attitude in the death penalty cases may be a departure from, rather
than an adherence to, prior theories of adjudicating fundamental rights.
93. 408 U.S. at 375, 383, 414.
94. See also Note, Capital Punishment: A Review of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 52
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 261, 279 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Capital Punishment].
95. Justice Stewart's opinion in Gregg, for instance, acknowledged that limits exist on this
deference, both in terms of reliability and constitutional standards. Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. at 173-74. See also text accompanying note 168 infra.
96. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 181, where Justice Stewart specifically pointed
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society, which elements are given greater weight in completing the
calculus? Are some elements, for example the prison population, given
no weight at all? And what if public opinion, albeit supportive of capi-
tal punishment, is misinformed as Justice Marshall contends?
Measuring society's moral pulse by the use of public opinion polls
which are limited to issues of capital punishment may not be accurate
at all in assessing contemporary standards of human dignity. Those
standards should not be viewed as moving in one direction with respect
to general notions of criminality and punishment and in another with
respect to particular notions of capital crimes. "Humane justice"
should contemplate the broad spectrum of social response to crime; as
treatment of offenders in general becomes liberalized, so too should
capital punishment be considered part of the whole penological picture.
The search for evolving standards should include a comparison of what
society once did to criminals with what it now does. 97 Thus, it is some-
what inconsistent to see a liberalizing trend in social response to pun-
ishment on the one hand and an approach which ignores this trend
when dealing with capital punishment. The historical analysis, which
at one point seemed important to the Court in Gregg, suggests that cap-
ital punishment issues require a broader consideration of standards of
decency. However, the Court appears willing to accept a narrower con-
cept of public morality and relies, in part, on such restricted indicators
of public sentiment. 98
Perhaps direct measurement of public opinion on capital punishment
should be the leading gauge of contemporary standards of decency for
eighth amendment analysis. The dissenters in Furman and the major-
ity in Gregg determined that public opinion did in fact equate with
standards of contemporary decency. They examined public opinion
through direct measurement such as polls, state constitutional amend-
ments,99 and the actions of capital juries, as well as through legislative
enactments.
However, reliance on public sentiment as the equivalent of public
morality is somewhat misplaced. Public sentiment is undoubtedly
based, in part, upon perceptions of events, cause and effect, and other
out that California voters had amended the state constitution to reinstate capital punishment
in response to People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 439 P.2d 889, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cer.
denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
97. See G. GOTTLIEB, supra note 70, at 14 and part IV A.
98. Virtually every public opinion poll cited in the capital punishment cases is limited to
questions on the acceptability of death sentences and not punishment in general. See note
143 infra.
99. See note 96 supra.
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social phenomena. Justice Marshall rested his opinon in Furman on
the ground that mass public opinion which favored capital punishment
was an improper measurement. He considered separately that portion
of the public which favored capital punishment due to a utilitarian be-
lief in the deterrent effect of the death penalty. Because this portion of
the public based its opinion, at least partially, on matters capable of
scientific proof, Justice Marshall felt that it would be unwise to allow
uninformed or misinformed public opinion to influence a constitutional
standard.10°
Justice Marshall discounted almost entirely that portion of the public
which based its advocacy of capital punishment upon retributive be-
liefs. To Marshall, neither retribution nor vengeance could form any
part of the criminal sanction and neither could be the basis for its ac-
ceptability; this is just what the eighth amendment was designed to pro-
hibit. 1 1
That public sentiment equates to some extent with public morality
seems self-evident. But several questions arise from this assumption
which are apparently overlooked by the Justices, with the notable ex-
ception of Justice Marshall. For instance, without doubting the accu-
racy of public opinion polls, one of their faults is their instantaneous
nature of measurement. Is public opinion relevant on the day of argu-
ment before the Supreme Court? On the day the challenged death stat-
ute was enacted? 0 2 On the day of the crime?0 3 Or should the Court
be looking at trends; at public opinion over time? And if so, over how
long a period of time?
100. 408 U.S. at 344-45.
101. Id
102. Especially when recognizing evolving standards of decency, the state of public mo-
rality, at the time that a long-standing piece of legislation was enacted, might not be all that
relevant. See Victor, Furman v. Georgia: The Burger Court Looks at Judicial Review, 1972
LAW & Soc. ORD. 393, 398 [hereinafter cited as Victor]: "The deference usually owed legis-
lative acts likewise may not be justified when the challenged statute has remained on the
books for an extended period of time, untouched and unconsidered by the legislature." See
also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 148, 151. All capital statutes now existing are recent enact-
ments, but that does not per se indicate an underlying moral consensus. See note 191 infra
and accompanying text. Furthermore, much of the rush to reinstate capital punishment
after Furman was done without reexamining relevant social criteria. Victor, supra at 402.
103. In Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977), the Supreme Court upheld defendant's
death sentence for a murder that he committed prior to the decision in Furman. Furman
had also invalidated the Florida statute then in existence, by implication, so that there was
no death penalty "in effect" in Florida at the time of the murder. Insofar as petitioner was
tried and sentenced after Furman, under a statute found valid in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976), the death sentence was affirmed. The Court ruled that Florida had put the de-
fendant on "constructive notice" of the penalty which the state would seek to impose on him
for the crime.
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What do surveys of public opinion indicate about attitudes toward the
death penalty? Such attitudes have been periodically assessed in nation-
wide surveys for about 40 years. For the first 30 of these years opinion
moved steadily against the death penalty; from a high of 62 percent in
1936, support for the death penalty declined until 1966, when only 40
percent of the American people registered in favor of it. However, in the
last 10 years, the downward trend has reversed dramatically; recent polls
indicate that about 60 percent of the public now favors capital punish-
ment.104
In an interesting twist on the dangers incumbent with short-term
measurement, the dissenters in Coker v. Georgial0 5 cautioned that in-
stantaneous reading of legislative enactments was misleading. The fact
that Georgia was the sole jurisdiction then authorizing capital punish-
ment for rape was termed by Chief Justice Burger as "not particularly
relevant." "[T]wo other states - Louisiana and North Carolina -
have enacted death penalty statutes for adult rape since this Court's
1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia . . . .If the Court is to rely on
some 'public opinion' process, does this not suggest the beginning of a
'trend'?" 0 6 But the Court in Woodson v. North Carolina,10 7 seemed
unwilling to accept evidence of a "sudden reversal of societal values" in
assessing the constitutionality of mandatory death penalties. The
Woodson Court escaped the quandry presented here by discounting
the genuineness of post-Furman enactments as true demands for
mandatory sentencing.1
0 8
One of the virtues of the constitutional amendment process is that it
is slow. Instantaneous public sentiment might influence legislation, but
the major principles of American jurisprudence and the fundamental
rights of our society cannot be so readily changed. 0 9 Commenting on
this issue, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Commonwealh v.
O'Neal' ° stated:
Passing public passions and emotions (understandable as they may be
at times such as these) have little to do with the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, as it is written. Referendums, although they serve some purpose, do
not pretend to construe the Constitution. They express only ephemeral
sentiments, sentiments which are highly variable over time and which
may reflect public attitudes shaped by collateral problems and events of
the day. Public sentiment becomes relevant to constitutional adjudication
104. Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 10, at 175 (footnotes omitted).
105. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
106. Id at 613.
107. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
108. Id at 298.
109. See Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 26, at 1778-82 & n.39.
110. 339 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. 1975).
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only if it results in a constitutional amendment. This is a result which
occurs only when the public sentiment is sufficiently high and sustained
so that it is not dissipated with the passing of time and further reflec-
tion. I11
A similar view was expressed by former Chief Justice Donald Wrighi
of the California Supreme Court in commenting on People v.
Anderson. 12 But notwithstanding the approaches which prevailed in
California and Massachusetts, the United States Supreme Court clearly
has a different view on the importance of public opinion.' 13 The voters
of California did respond to Anderson with a constitutional amend-
ment which reinstated the death penalty. But it is the amendment it-
self, and not anticipation of it, which should affect the interpretation of
"cruel and unusual." '14
Another use of popular sentiment might validly be found under a
constitutional test which links popular morality to the level of eighth
amendment protection. Perhaps the level of deference to legislative
judgment should depend upon the strength of public support for partic-
ular criminal legislation. As it now stands, the burden of proof on the
factual issues associated with capital punishment rests with the chal-
lengers.'1 5 If contemporary standards of decency, as measured by pub-
lic sentiment, clearly favored capital punishment with overwhelming
11. Id at 692 (emphasis in original).
112. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 648-49, 493 P.2d 880, 893, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 165-66, cert. denied, 406
U.S. 957 (1972). See also Wright, The Role of the Judiciary: From Marbury to Anderson, 60
CALIF. L. Rav. 1262, 1273 (1972).
113. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 179-83.
114. Thus, the fact that the people of California amended their Constitution after the
highest court of that State declared the death penalty unconstitutional does not indicate
to me that we should not reach and decide a properly presented constitutional issue in
accordance with our considered views of the statute and Constitution. It merely indi-
cates the possibility that an amendment to our Constitution may be the popular re-
sponse to our decision. If this eventuates, so be it. The amendment, and not a judicial
anticipation of such a response, is the proper constitutional procedure.
Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 339 N.E.2d at 692-93 (emphasis in original).
115. The blanket presumption of a deterrent effect of capital punishment is seemingly at
odds with fundamental rights of jurisprudence in other areas. In Gregg, Justice Stewart
stated: "We may nevertheless assume safely that there are murderers, such as those who act
in passion, for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But for many
others, the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent." 428 U.S. at 185-86. This
"intuitive" observation ignores the development of "strict scrutiny" analysis flowing from
the famous footnote number four in U.S. v. Caroline Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
The only logical explanation of this approach is that the fundamental right found in the
eighth amendment is not the guarantee of life per se, but only of humane sentences. Conse-
quently, the legislature need not bear the burden of justification regarding the deterrrent
effect of capital punishment until such time as "contemporary standards of decency" em-
brace the right not to be executed as fundamental.
The problem with this logic is that conventional morality purportedly tolerates capital
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support, then all presumptions of validity might rest with the legisla-
tures. But as the Court becomes less sure of public sentiment, as in the
death penalty area where opinion is divided, a capital statute should
require a greater level of justification in order to be sustained. As
standards of decency become less tolerant of capital punishment, a
stronger nexus should be required between executions and the social
goals sought to be obtained thereby.
Justice Marshall suggested a similar approach to equal protection
scrutiny in his dissent in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez :
116
A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has
applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly vi-
olative of the Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum clearly compre-
hends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize
particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and
societal importance of the interest adversely affected .... 117
Divining the public morals is a problem recurrent throughout consti-
tutional litigation.' 18 It has wended its way into the criminal law in
"shock the conscience" tests1 1 9 and is now institutionally a part of
eighth amendment jurisprudence. The arguments against the use of
public sentiment to gauge the moral standards of society are strong.
For instance, Professor Hart states:
To tell judges that the expression of the community's moral indignation
is "the ultimate justification" of punishment is to tempt them from the
task of acquiring knowledge of and thinking about the effects of what
they are doing. And for the community to think that there is something
sacrosanct about its scale of moral evaluations may, as Mill long ago told
us, stultify its advance. For these evaluations may plainly rest on inade-
quate understanding or appreciations of facts. . . . Or should we hope
that the law might here and elsewhere not passively reflect uninstructed
opinion but actively help to shape moral sentiments to rational common
ends?120
Notwithstanding, the majority of the Justices appear to reject this the-
punishment, in part, because of its presumed deterrent effect. It seems the Court has as-
sumed the conclusion in order to prove the premise. See also note 19 supra.
116. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117. Id at 98-99. See also Angel, supra note 24, at 64: "[In substantive due process analy-
sis, the] nexus required between means and ends depends on the importance of the interest
affected by the legislation."
118. Perry, supra note 40, at 709.
119. Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 360-61 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (2d
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
120. H. HART, PUNismENT AND THE ELIMINATION OF RESPONSIBILITY 16-17 (1962).
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ory of judicial review, preferring a notion of human dignity that is tied
to popular sentiment and holding that in interpreting the eighth
amendment, the Court will objectively search out that sentiment.
121
D. Jury Action
Because the standard for humane punishments is tied to contempo-
rary moral values, the jury provides a necessary and reliable gauge of
those values.
[O]ne of the most important functions any jury can perform in making
such a selection [between sentences of death and imprisonment] is to
maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal
system - a link without which the determination of punishment could
hardly reflect "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society."'
122
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 23 the Court struck down a statute which
provided for the exclusion for cause of any juror "who shall, on being
examined, state he has conscientious scruples against capital punish-
ment, or that he is opposed to the same."' 24 Justice Stewart's majority
opinion held that such "death qualified" juries violated the defendant's
sixth amendment 25 right to an impartial jury. To do otherwise would
be to insulate the sentencing process from the community and to "en-
trust the determination of whether a man should live or die to a tribu-
nal organized to return a verdict of death."'
' 26
The procedural due process and sixth amendment analyses of
Witherspoon are readily applied in an eighth amendment context. 27
All of the capital cases have referred to jury action as an indicator of
contemporary morals. This goes beyond Witherspoon; not only will an
individual defendant enjoy the possibility of jury lenity, but broad-
based jury rejection of death sentences might influence the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty for all defendants.
121. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 175.
122. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1967) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958)).
123. 391 U.S. 510 (1967).
124. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (1959).
125. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
126. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 521.
127. But see Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 269, 295 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Tribe]. Professor Tribe views Witherspoon as most comprehensible as
an eighth amendment decision. As such, it would be an analytic approach to the eighth
amendment, relying upon the sixth amendment for specific standards. This explanation
seems accurate, especially in light of the Court's statement: "Nor does the decision in this
case affect the validity of any sentence other than one of death." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. at 523 n.21 (emphasis in original).
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In Furman, Justice Brennan suggested that the relative infrequency
of death sentences meted out by capital juries indicated public antipa-
thy for these punishments.128 Justice Powell came to the opposite con-
clusion in his dissent: "[T]hese [statistical] considerations fall short of
indicating that juries are imposing the death penalty with such rarity as
to justify this Court in reading into this circumstance a public rejection
of capital punishment."' 129 Whichever way the figures are found
significant, most members of the Court do recognize that jury action is
one of the objective indicia referred to in assessing contemporary val-
ues. 13
0
Juries might be constrained to reflect their conscience in the verdict
rather than in decisions on appropriate sentences. This might occur
whenever a particular sentence is automatically imposed upon a find-
ing of guilt. This 'jury nullification" - rejection of the legislatively
declared sentence - results in acquittals or verdicts of lesser included
offenses, despite evidence establishing culpability for the charged of-
fense. Consequently, the jury reflects community values through its ex-
pression of the appropriate punishment for a particular offense. "If
juries were regularly refusing to convict men of a particular crime when
cognizant of the statutory punishment, it would be absurd to contend
that the punishment is proportional to the crime."'
13 1
Jury action on a statistical basis may have a great bearing on eighth
amendment standards. This may be of little solace for those defend-
ants who find themselves before particularly unsympathtic juries. Al-
though the Supreme Court has suggested a structure which compares
each capital jury to every other one within the state, none of the opin-
ions reveals what level of jury rejection of death sentences would be
significant for eighth amendment purposes.
V. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
A. Deterrence
Deterrence is a justification for punishment because as a component
of utilitarianism it produces a net beneficial good for society. Utilitari-
anism is the basis for Jeremy Bentham's theory of legislation' 2 -a the-
128. 408 U.S. at 399 (Brennan, J., concurring).
129. Id at 441 (Powell, J., dissenting).
130. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 181.
131. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth
Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REv. 838, 848 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Wheeler-I]. See notes
180-87 infra and accompanying text.
132. J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 93-94 (1931): "According to the princi-
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ory which is central to our system of government. Proportionality re-
quirements reflect the utilitarian principle that no penalty may cause
more suffering than the crime unchecked. 133
There are many value judgments implicit in the supposition that cap-
ital punishment deters. It is a rejection, or at least a setting aside, of
other moral argument§ against sanctioned execution which may lessen
their utilitarian value. More importantly, arguments based on deter-
rence often fail to consider the net detrimental effects on society (also
part of utilitarianism) which are caused by capital punishment. 34 This
is not to imply that such detrimental effects are ignored. The prime
example of their recognition is the discontinuance of the public execu-
tion. Just as violence on television is suggested to replicate itself on the
streets, public executions seemingly remove some of the moral reproba-
tion for killing in general. But these effects may be beyond determina-
tion and are always absent from the sociologist's study. Due to their
amorphous character, these long-term social effects are usually omitted
from arguments based on deterrence.
Deterrence relies on each individual's hedonistic utilitarianism.
Each of us, according to Bentham, acts as a utility maximizer. Conse-
quently, the utilitarian model envisions the rational criminal's weighing
the potential discomfort - punishment - against the expected gain
from committing a crime. This can be expressed analytically as fol-
lows: the pain of sanction, discounted by the improbability of being
caught and punished, must be more than the pleasure derived from the
offense; otherwise, the crime will be committed. However, murder is
the only crime worthy of capital punishment, 35 and it is seldom perpe-
trated by rational thinking individuals who are thinking rationally at
the time of the crime.'3 6 Thus, the immediate gain virtually always
appears to exceed the potential cost because that cost is usually not
pie of utility, [the legislature] ought never to impose a burden except for the purpose of
conferring a benefit of a clearly greater value."
133. See notes 180-87 infra and accompanying text.
134. Professor Collin Turnbull has written a graphic and compelling description of the
social impact of capital punishment from an anthropological perspective. Turnbull, Death by
Decree, NAT. HIsT., May 1978, at 65:
All this horror, a result of the technology, is surely one of the most telling arguments
against capital punishment, for the strain and stress, the alcholism, broken families,
and mental breakdown reach out beyond the confines of the prison. So does the brutal-
ization that mars the lives not only of inmates but of all those touched by the death
penalty ....
135. See note 217 infra and accompanying text.
136. This observation is contrary to Justice Stewart's assumption that "for many [murder-
ers], the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at
185-86.
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considered. Few murderers are rational utilitarians at the time of their
acts.
The qualitative jump in pain from life imprisonment to execution
1 37
should be significantly outweighed by the improved deterrence ob-
served. But the best to be said at this point, after years of study in
scores of countries, is that the evidence is inconclusive. The utilitarian
operates on the assumption that a definite pain is ultimately offset by a
collective good. If this hypothesis is not capable of proof, or yet
proven, does utilitarianism alone justify infliction of the pain?
The Supreme Court has not required that deterrence be the sole fac-
tor in assessing the propriety of a punishment; it also permits consider-
ation of retributive theory. However, the extent to which retribution
actually contributes to popular sentiment, and thus to contemporary
standards of decency, is not well known. And the degree to which it
may support the legislatures' determinations of proper punishments is
not clearly explained. Neither the quality of retributive feelings nor a
proper description of this moral jusitifcation is discussed in the capital
cases.
B. Retribution
The majorities in the death penalty cases were willing to accept retri-
bution as a valid factor in measuring contemporary standards of de-
cency. "Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal
law, . . but neither is it a forbidden objective nor one inconsistent
with our respect for the dignity of men."
138
In his concurrence in Furman, Justice Stewart was unwilling to reject
retribution as an appropriate consideration of criminal sanctions, a sen-
timent shared by many of the Justices:
I would say only that I cannot agree that retribution is a constitution-
ally impermissible ingredient in the imposition of punishment. The in-
stinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that
instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important pur-
pose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law. When peo-
ple begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to
impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they "deserve," then
there are sown the seeds of anarchy ....
Retribution as an element of the criminal sanction causes significant
137. See id at 187: "There is no question that death as a punishment is unique in its
severity and irrevocability."
138. Id at 183.
139. 408 U.S. at 309.
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problems both in definition and in justification. As a theory of "right,"
pure retribution ostensibly serves a useful purpose by reinforcing soci-
ety's basic moral values. Opponents of retribution, from Aristotle to
Justice Marshall, argue that this moral theory "looks only to the past
and serves no useful future social purpose." 14° Indeed, retribution is
concerned only with past events; forward looking interpretations or jus-
tifications tend to be utilitarian in nature.141
However, the retribution spoken of in Furman and Gregg transcends
Kant's pure moral theory of right and approaches utilitarian justifica-
tion. Justice Stewart's perception of retribution is nothing more than
deterrence. Not deterrence of potential criminals but of the public at
large which may otherwise become dissatisfied with our system of jus-
tice and take matters into its own hands. The "anarchy of self-help,
vigilante justice, and lynch law," was what Justice Stewart saw looming
on the horizon.1 42 This is surely not the pure retributive philosophy of
Kant. It is also not beyond the sociologists' empirical methods to deter-
mine whether a particular punishment does in fact serve the social ends
of stability, harmony, and respect for legal process. If these theoretical
underpinnings of capital punishment were acknowledged, it is unlikely
they could lend much support for its continued validity. "IT]here exists
no persuasive documentation that either the availability or the imposi-
tion of capital punishment deters private citizens from exacting illegal
vengeance. 'Lynch law' clearly has not become common during this
century even though a progressive abandonment of the death penalty
has occurred." '143 Retributive theories are commonly explained in
terms of social benefit and are thereby becoming utilitarian in nature.
To many critics, pure retribution is "the abandonment of any serious
attempt to provide a moral justification for punishment.
144
The contrast between deterrence and retribution is highlighted here
because they are the two justifications for capital punishment employed
140. Angel, supra note 24, at 79 n.68.
141. H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 232 (1968) [hereinafter cited as H.
HART]. Hart uses a retributive model which excludes possible future social benefits which
might otherwise flow from punishment of an offender. This feature derives from Kant who
insisted that responding to moral misconduct with suffering is a good per se - a moral
imperative - so that even on the last day of society, when utilitarian considerations are, by
premise, absent, "the murderer not only may but must be executed." Id at 75.
142. 428 U.S. at 183; 408 U.S. at 308.
143. Thomas, Eighth Amendment Challenges to the Death Penalty: The Relevence of In-
formed Public Opinion, 30 VAND. L. REv. 1005, 1017 n.51 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Thomas].
144. H. HART, supra note 141, at 235.
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by both proponents and critics.'45 Both theories are validated in Gregg,
but their postures are conceptually different. The validity of deterrence
as a justification is capable of being tested and is being tested.146 Con-
sequently, challengers to the death penalty may soon be able to ap-
proach the burden of proof placed upon them by the Supreme Court
with acceptable evidence.'
47
On the other hand, pure retributive theories cannot be tested. Ac-
cordingly, it is important to know the following: Does the Court
actually rely on utilitarianism or retribution? If the Court relies on ret-
ribution, to what extent does it so rely?148 What portion of the public
which supports capital punishment bases its acquiescence on its belief
in the deterrent value of capital punishment? If, for instance, public
support is based principally on retributive theories, could this alone de-
fine the contours of standards of decency? If this were the case, studies
on the deterrent effect of capital punishment would lose vitality in en-
deavoring to undermine or support its constitutionality.
VI. STUDIES ON PUBLIC OPINION
When Furman was decided, there were few sophisticated studies on
the breadth and scope of public opinion. Only superficial polls were
available. These polls indicated a recent upswing in public demand for
capital punishment. 149 But as a result of their superficiality, Justice
145. Justice Stewart refers to a third purpose, incapacitation of dangerous criminals.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 187 n.28. But this is merely an aspect of utilitarian theory
and, in fact, of deterrence. The incapacitation of dangerous criminals specifically deters a
defendant from committing future crime, as opposed to generally deterring third persons
from illegal conduct. It is obvious that capital punishment is a better incapacitator than
lesser sanctions, but the Court has never suggested that this, standing alone, justifies the
penalty.
Although in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), the dissenters stressed that "death
finally forecloses the possibility that a prisoner will commit further crimes," they focused on
general deterrence as the "principal battleground" for constitutional analysis. Id at 354.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), also suggests that the state's need for effective inca-
pacitation cannot overcome the constitutional requirement of proportionality. But see id at
605 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
146. See note 163 infra.
147. In Gregg, the plurality felt forced to conclude, "in the absence of more convincing
evidence, that the infliction of death. . . is not unconstitutionally severe." 428 U.S. at 218.
Just how convincing the evidence must be remains unclear. If new studies show the absence
of a superior deterrent effect with increasing reliability, the Justices may have to place
greater reliance on retributive justifications or take an absolutist approach regarding defer-
ence, as does Justice Rehnquist.
148. "Critics further argue that retribution can set the limit on the amount of punishment
that should be imposed, but cannot itself justify the imposition of any punishment." Angel,
supra note 24, at 79 n.68. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 236-40 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
149. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
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Marshall discounted these figures as being unreliable. He suggested
that the American public was uninformed or misinformed about the
reality of capital punishment, particularly its deterrent value. Marshall
suggested that "informed opinion" would reject the death penalty. To
Marshall, the only credible public opinion was that which appreciated
that "the death penalty is no more effective a deterrent than life impris-
onment, that convicted murderers are rarely executed . that con-
victed murderers are usually model prisoners ... that .they almost
always become law abiding citizens upon their release from prison"
and that the penalty is imposed in a discriminatory manner. 150 Be-
tween the Furman and Gregg decisions, several studies were undertaken
to test the "Marshall hypothesis?' 15 1
In Furman, I observed that the American people are largely unaware of
the information critical to a judgment on the morality of the death pen-
alty, and concluded that if they were better informed they would consider
it shocking, unjust, and unacceptable. A recent study, conducted after the
enactment of the post-Furman statutes, has confirmed that the American
people know little about the death penalty, and that the opinions of an
informed public would differ significantly from those of a public unaware
of the consequences and effects of the death penalty.'52
A study conducted by Sarat and Vidmar 53 basically lends credence
to Justice Marshall's theory that a significant portion of public support
for the death penalty comes from an uninformed populous.
It was found that our subjects knew little about the death penalty, par-
ticularly its effectiveness. It was also found that when exposed to infor-
mation about capital punishment, especially information regarding its
utilitarian aspects, a substantial proportion of the subjects altered their
opinions toward it. . . . [Elven a cautious reading of our results leads to
the conclusions that an informed public opinion about the death penalty
may differ substantially from one that is uninformed and that these differ-
ences in support may be almost totally accounted for by persons who do
not consider retribution as a legitimate, or at least important, justification
for capital punishment. 
5 4
The Sarat and Vidmar study was considered important by Justice Mar-
shall, particularly in light of an intervening study by Isaac Ehrlich
55
150. Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 10 at 179.
151. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 232-36 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152. Id at 232 (footnotes omitted).
153. Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 10.
154. Id at 195-96.
155. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment:.A Question of Life and Death, 65
AM. ECON. REv. 397 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Ehrlich]. Ehrlich concluded that, "in view
of the new evidence presented here, one cannot reject the hypothesis that law enforcement
activities in general and execution in particular do exert a deterrent effect on acts of mur-
der." Id at 416.
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which found that a systematically employed capital statute would in
fact deter homicide.'
56
Sarat and Vidmar's analysis of the Marshall hypothesis impressed no
other Justice with the possible exception of Brennan. Part of the reason
might be that the study did little to discover the extent of support which
retributive beliefs lent to the use of capital punishment. Retribution,
vengeance, and even the broader concept of reprobation are beyond
empirical proof. These concepts may be analyzed. Unlike utilitarian
justifications, however, they are not capable of being correct or incor-
rect. The fact that Americans believe in these concepts is the important
element, not why they may have these beliefs.
Professor Charles Thomas conducted a study prior to Gregg and
after Furman in which he sought to identify the determinants of public
support for capital punishment. 157 He attempted to separate retributive
from deterrent sentiments. Thomas found that the two factors were
strongly related, that persons holding utilitarian or deterrent beliefs
tended to embrace retributive sentiments, and vice versa.15 8 Conse-
quently, many people in favor of the death penalty support it because
they believe it to be morally just and because as a deterrent, it is benefi-
cial for society. However, in analyzing the relative strengths of these
disparate factors of support, Thomas found as follows:
[A]lthough the independent impact of retributive beliefs on support for
capital punishment is relatively weak, the independent effect of utilitarian
beliefs is substantial. Thus apparently those in the sample subscribing to
retributive beliefs about punishment are not willing to support capital
punishment unless they also believe that it serves some useful purpose -
deterrence.
• . . [R]etributive beliefs do correlate with a willingness to support the
death penalty, but only when these notions of just punishment are bol-
stered by the complementary belief that the imposition of the death pen-
alty will serve what they view as a useful purpose.1
9
Thomas did not find the reverse to be true; persons who exhibited
predominantly utilitarian support for capital punishment generally
maintained that support when the factor of retribution was statistically
removed.' 60 Thomas' study does not easily convert into simple per-
156. The Ehrlich study has come under attack. See studies collected in Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. at 235 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
157. Thomas, supra note 143, at 1016.
158. Id at 1018-20. This was accomplished through the use of multivariate analysis,
which essentially holds constant the influence of retributive belief on each member of the
sample while testing for belief in deterrent values; it then similarly tests for retributive sup-
port by holding the effect of deterrence support constant.
159. Id at 1024-26.
160. Id at 1026.
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centages of those who voiced support based solely on retributive be-
liefs; his analysis is more comparative than absolute. But it can be read
to suggest that less than one fourth of his sample believed retribution to
be a sufficient justification for capital punishment. 1 '
The Thomas study does suggest that support for the death penalty is
based predominantly on belief in its deterrent value. But the majority
in Gregg concluded that "there is no convincing empirical evidence ei-
ther supporting or refuting" the superior deterrent effect of capital pun-
ishment.1 6 1 Still the best, albeit inconclusive, evidence indicates that
capital punishment provides no overall superior deterrent effect. 163
These two converging areas of statistical analysis - the first consist-
ing of the Marshall hypothesis and the Thomas study, the second cast-
ing substantial doubt on the deterrent value of capital punishment -
undermine a constitutional standard which would have an unexamined
and superficial public opinion determine the contours of the eighth
amendment. The "evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society"'" are not coterminous with public opinion
polls. Notwithstanding a possible enlightenment of public opinion, a
more difficult problem might arise if legislatures were still to respond to
that segment of society which demanded capital statutes. The capital
cases may suggest that legislative judgments standing alone do not sat-
isfy the Court.' 65 To Justice Marshall, developments since Gregg have
underscored his contention that legislative judgments do not reflect
contemporary standards of decency. In Lockett v. Ohio, 66 he re-
marked: "That the State of Ohio chose to permit imposition of the
death penalty under a purely vicarious theory of liability seems to belie
the notion that the Court can discern the 'evolving standards of de-
cency' . . . embodied in the Eighth Amendment, by reference to state
161. But see Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 10, at 176, 191-94 & n.90. "Because death pen-
alty support remained firm even when beliefs about deterrence changed, we are thus in-
clined to infer that retribution is probably a causal factor working against movement of
death penalty opinion." Id at 194 n.90.
162. 428 U.S. at 185.
163. Seeprimarily authorities collected in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183 n.29, 235 n.8;
T. SELLIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 138 (1967); Sellin, The Death Penalty 23-24, in MODEL
PENAL CODE, Appendix (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). But see Ehrlich, supra note 155; Leh-
tinen, supra note 12, at 238 ("ITlhere is no evidence that proves the death penalty is not a
unique deterrent.").
164. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
165. "Although legislative measures adopted by the people's chosen representatives pro-
vide one important means of ascertaining contemporary values, it is evident that legislative
judgments alone cannot be determinative of Eighth Amendment standards since that
Amendment was intended to safeguard individuals from the abuse of legislative power."
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 174 n.19.
166. 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978).
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'legislative judgments' . . 167
VII. "EXCESSIVENESS" AS A LIMIT ON THE USE OF OBJECTIVE
INDICIA
The plurality in Gregg qualified the use of public opinion and legis-
lative enactments as indicators of public morality:
[O]ur cases also make clear that public perceptions of standards of de-
cency with respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive. A penalty
also must accord with "the dignity of man," which is the "basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment". . . . This means, at least, that the
punishment not be "excessive."
' 168
This qualification has been reiterated in each capital case since Gregg.
It has been partially responsible for the judgments in those cases which
have invalidated the following: mandatory death penalties; 69 the death
penalty for rape;' 7° and limitations on the use of mitigating circum-
stances by the sentencing body.17 1 The excessiveness limitation prohib-
its those punishments which involve the unnecessary infliction of pain
or those which are disproportionate to the offense.
4. Unnecessary Infliction of Pain
The first component of excessiveness, that the punishment may not
involve the unnecessary infliction of pain, might seem to require that
penologic objectives be achieved through the least severe method possi-
ble.' 72 Naturally, this would embroil the Court in the controversy over
the utility of capital punishment as a deterrent, a matter which it has
chosen to defer to the competence of the legislatures. Instead, the capi-
tal punishment cases have interpreted the excessiveness limitation as
requiring that any given punishment be imposed without additional
pain which otherwise adds nothing to the purpose of that punishment.
In Wilkerson v. Utah, 73 the Court found it "safe to affirm that punish-
ments of torture, . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary
cruelty, are forbidden by [the eighth] amendment to the Constitu-
tion." '' 7 Consequently, corporal punishment attendant with the execu-
167. Id at 2972 (Marshall, J., concurring).
168. 428 U.S. at 173.
169. Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 644 (1977) (per curiam); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
170. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
171. Bell v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2977 (1978); Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978).
172. See note 178 infra and accompanying text.
173. 99 U.S. 130 (1879).
174. Id at 136.
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tion of a death sentence is unnecessary and therefore excessive. In
Francis v. Resweber,175 after an unsuccessful first attempt, a second at-
tempt at electrocution was held constitutional because the added pain
was unintentional. The cruelty against which the Constitution protects
a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not
the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish
life humanely. The fact that an unforeseeable accident prevented the
prompt consummation of the sentence cannot add an element of cru-
elty to a subsequent execution. 176 Prior to Furman, the cases employ-
ing the necessity test 77 all involved challenges to the mode of
execution. Basically, they held that the only modes of execution per-
mitted by the eighth amendment are those in which death is not linger-
ing. All others are unnecessarily cruel.
In Furman, Justices Brennan and Marshall applied the necessity test
to the penological purpose of the punishment itself, suggesting an ex-
tension of the cases cited above. Justice Brennan stated that, "[A] se-
vere punishment must not be excessive. . . .If there is a significantly
less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the
punishment is inflicted . ..the punishment inflicted is unnecessary
and therefore excessive."'7i 8 To Justices Stewart and White, the punish-
ment was unnecessary where its infrequent and wanton application
under the discretionary statutes served no penal justification.
[T]he death penalty could so seldom be imposed that it would cease to be
a credible deterrent or measurably to contribute to any other end of pun-
ishment .... At the moment that it ceases realistically to further these
purposes ... the emerging question is whether its imposition in such cir-
cumstances would violate the Eighth Amendment. It is my view that it
would, for its imposition would then be the pointless and needless extinc-
tion of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or
public purposes.
179
175. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
176. Id at 464. Professor Wheeler suggests two grounds upon which an intentional
added punishment might be declared unconstitutional:
(1) The legislative body did not authorize corporal punishment in addition to execu-
tion, so the intentionally added punishment would have been beyond the scope of the
penal administrators' power and hence unconstitutional; and (2) execution preceded by
the painful application of electrical current is a new and unusual punishment which
fails to satisfy [the goals of the criminal sanction]. Furthermore, it adds nothing to
incapacitation that immediate execution does not supply.
Wheeler-II, supra note 34, at 69 n.34.
177. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (challenging electrocution as a valid mode
of execution); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (same); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130
(1879).
178. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring).
179. Id at 311-12 (White, J., concurring). Justice Stewart stated:
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In the final analysis, however, the majorities in Gregg and the capital
cases which followed were unwilling to deny that valid state purposes
could be served by death penalties pursuant to carefully drawn statutes.
Consequently, it could not be said that capital punishment per se was
clearly unnecessary.
B. Proportionaliy
The more important aspect of the excessiveness limitation is its re-
quirement for proportionality in sentencing. Professor Wheeler sug-
gests that necessity tests employed in the death penalty cases can be
adequately explained under the concept of proportionality. 180 He fur-
ther suggests that the concept of proportionality was foremost among
the principles underlying the framers' intent in adopting the eighth
amendment. 1
8 1
The two major moral theories of punishment, utilitarianism and
right/retribution, both implicitly require proportionality in sentenc-
ing.'" 2 Proportionality had its roots in early tenets of Western civiliza-
tion. A significant portion of the Magna Carta was devoted to the
proportionality of punishment to crime: "A free man shall not be
amerced for a trivial offence, except in accordance with the degree of
the offence; and for a serious offence he shall be amerced according to
its gravity. . . ." A primary purpose of the Declaration of Right was
to reiterate the common law prohibition of disproportionate penal-
ties.18
3
The principal of proportionality requires both relative and absolute
proportionality. Relative proportionality demands that serious crimes
be punished more severely than lesser crimes and its corollary, that mi-
nor crimes be sanctioned less harshly than major offenses. One of the
primary purposes of utilitarian proportionality is to induce a would-be
[No discretionary] state has made a legislative determination that forcible rape and
murder can be deterred only by imposing the penalty of death upon all who perpetrate
those offenses . . . .[I]t is clear that these sentences are "cruel" in the sense that they
excessively go beyond, not in degree but in kind, the punishments that the state legisla-
tures have determined to be necessary.
Id at 308-09 (Stewart, J., concurring).
180. Wheeler-II, supra note 34, at 72.
181. Id
182. Rehabilitation does not contain an element of proportionality. The defendant is
confined until rehabilitated, irrespective of the gravity or social harm of his offense. See
Angel, supra note 24, at 80.
183. Wheeler-I, supra note 131, at 853. See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 100: "The
phrase ['cruel and unusual punishment'] in our Constitution was taken directly from the




malfeasant to commit the least harmful crime. Because all rationally
acting criminals employ act utilitarianism, a premise essential to deter-
rence theory,18 4 there would be no inducement to refrain from serious
offenses if their penalties were no greater than those meted out for
lesser crimes. Furthermore, "striking fear into the hearts of all citizens
with spectacular punishments for petty crimes may effectively deter
crime, but the deterioration of law and social fabric which might follow
is a limiting factor."1 5 Weems v. United States"8 6 may be explained
along the lines of proportionality among crimes and punishments.
There, the Supreme Court vacated a sentence of cadena
temporal-twelve years at hard labor wearing chains and permanent
loss of civil rights-for falsifying government ledger books. The Court
found that greater offenses received less harsh punishments.
The second requirement of proportionality is that a punishment must
be proportionate to the offense in some absolute measure; it should not
cause more suffering than the crime itself unchecked. Professor Hart
relates that both Bentham and Blackstone questioned the usefulness of
this aspect of proportionality as a guide to sentencing. How was one to
measure wickedness or suffering, to enable commensurability, in the
absence of quantitative units of either?"87 However, it is this aspect of
proportionality which has been stressed in the post-Gregg cases.
VIII. MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY CASES: WOODSON & ROBERTS
Woodson v. North Carolina 8' and Roberts v. Louisiana18 9 rejected
mandatory death sentencing schemes as unconstitutional on three
grounds: One, contemporary standards of decency were opposed to
them; two, they invited jury nullification; and three, they failed to allow
for individualization in sentencing. As to the objective indicators of
public morality,190 the pluralities noted that prior to Furman the trend
among the states was to replace mandatory sentencing schemes with
discretionary procedures. The several legislative responses to the rees-
tablishment of mandatory sentencing by Furman were explained away
as a misguided attempt to comply with the unclear requirements of
Furman, "rather than a renewed societial acceptance of mandatory
184. Accord, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183-86. But see text accompanying note 136
supra.
185. Wheeler-I, supra note 131, at 847-48.
186. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
187. H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND ELIMINATION, 3-4(1968).
188. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
189. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
190. See notes 75-131 supra and accompanying text.
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death sentencing."' 91 The pluralities found further evidence of the
evolving standards of decency in that sentencing juries were frequently
reluctant to convict persons of capital crimes in mandatory jurisdic-
tions.
92
This response by juries also created the second deficiency with re-
spect to mandatory sentencing. The resultant jury nullification1
93
would inevitably occur without legislatively created standards. 94 The
discretion afforded to juries allowed them to return lesser non-capital
verdicts. The pluralities found that this discretion was without legisla-
tively defined standards. "Every jury in a first-degree murder case is
instructed on the crimes of second-degree murder and manslaughter
and permitted to consider those verdicts even if there is not a scintilla
of evidence to support the lesser verdicts."' 9 5 Thus, in an indirect way,
the capital sentencing procedures in Woodson and Roberts had the po-
tential for the same arbitrary and wonton exercise of jury discretion as
the statute struck down in Furman.
The pluralities in Woodson and Roberts seem to have employed the
analytic approach in this analysis by relying almost exclusively on a
procedural due process argument. Thus, the discretion found available
in standardless verdict procedures required the vacating of sentences
despite the fact that those procedures may not have been "excessive" in
the accepted sense.
96
However, reliance on Furman for support is not strictly accurate. In
Furman, Justices Stewart and White found the death sentences under
the challenged statutes to be excessive because they were beyond "the
punishments that the state legislatures have determined to be neces-
sary."' 97 Because Georgia chose not to impose mandatory sentences on
convicted murderers, the legislature had indicated that the purposes of
its criminal justice system could be fulfilled by lesser sentences. "[The]
legislative will is not frustrated if the penalty is never imposed."' 98
Consequently, the death penalty in Furman was the unnecessary inflic-
191. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 298 n.34.
192. Id at 293-94; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 335.
193. See notes 122-31 supra and accompanying text.
194. 428 U.S. at 302-03; 428 U.S. at 334-35.
195. 428 U.S. at 334.
196. See also Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 324:
What the plurality opinion has actually done is to import into the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment what it conceives to be desirable procedural guarantees
where the punishment of death, concededly not cruel and unusual for the crime of
which the defendant was convicted, is to be imposed.
197. 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
198. Id at 311 (White, J., concurring).
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tion of pain only because the discretionary sentencing procedure
showed that the legislature felt death to be unnecessary.
The stated purposes of punishment were different under the Louisi-
ana and North Carolina schemes. Those legislatures, by enacting
mandatory legislation, manifested an intent that could be met only by
a death sentence in each case. Under this analysis, capital punishment
would not be the unnecessary infliction of pain; capital punishment
would be necessary in order to effectuate state policy.199
An alternative analysis might suggest that the pluralities thought the
prospect of jury nullification diminshed the deterrent effect of capital
punishment. Under this theory, the legislature would be unable to jus-
tify the harsh sentence of death. But this approach would be contrary
to the normal deference to legislative findings of deterrence employed
in Gregg. Furthermore, the dissenters in Woodson and Roberts were
unwilling to accept the likelihood of a widespread disregard of the ju-
rors' duties. Those Justices suggested that mandatory sentencing
schemes were superior in deterrence and retribution.
The discretion found available to juries in Woodson and Roberts also
prevented meaningful judicial review, as required by the Court in
Gregg. This required review serves to articulate standards for sentenc-
ing in capital cases. Therefore, the Court held in Woodson and Roberts
that, at the very least, each statute should provide for automatic review
of each capital sentence in order to standardize sentences and help en-
sure the constitutional application of required standards." ° The Court
in Gregg praised the Georgia review procedure,2 °1 which ostensibly en-
abled the state supreme court to ensure regularity in capital sentenc-
ing.202 For example, infrequent death sentences would be analyzed to
determine whether they indicated a general advance in community mo-
rality or merely selectivity in meting out those ultimate punishments.
But this review scheme would provide the highest state court with
evidence of public sentiment only if the appeal process allowed the re-
viewing court to analyze trends in all capital cases. The problem with
the Georgia procedure is that only those capital cases resulting in death
sentences are insured of reaching the state supreme court. The fre-
quency or circumstances of cases in which lesser sentences of imprison-
ment are imposed might escape review altogether.' 3
199. 428 U.S. at 337 (White, J., dissenting).
200. See also Capital tunishment, supra note 94, at 288.
201. This review scheme is found in GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537 (1977).
202. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 204-06.
203. Id at 205-06. Pursuant to GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537, the Georgia Supreme Court is
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The third ground for rejecting mandatory sentences was their failure
to allow for individualization in sentencing.2°4 This demand can be
seen as an extension of Witherspoon v. Illinois, °5 which requires that
community values be considered in each capital case through the me-
dium of jury leniency.
Individualization is also an aspect of the proportionality require-
ment; the moral wickedness of the crime should be relative to the char-
acter of the defendant." 6 Therefore, in some cases a sentence of death
might exceed the harm caused society by the offense.2"7
Particularized consideration of each defendant is also a required ele-
ment of substantive due process analysis.208 Individualization de-
mands a close nexus between the purpose of the criminal law and the
punishment in each case. This is in essence a "least restrictive alterna-
tive" attack on capital sentencing. It follows Professor Tribe's concept
of "structural due process' 209 with ad hoc determinations that the sub-
stantive state interest will be furthered in each case.
210
IX. PER SE CHALLENGE TO THE DEATH PENALTY FOR RAPE:
COKER v GEORGIA
In Coker v. Georgia,2" the Court did not decide whether the death
penalty for rape "measurably serve[d] the legitimate ends of punish-
to compare the death sentence under review to sentences of other like cases. "The court
shall include in its decision a reference to those similar cases which it took into considera-
tion." Id
There may be some uncertainty in the genuineness or thoroughness of this review. In
Floyd v. State, 210 S.E.2d 810 (Ga. 1974), the death penalty for robbery was vacated because
it had been rarely imposed. But in all four "similar" robbery cases cited by the Georgia
Supreme Court, the death penalty had been imposed. Id at 814. In Coley v. State, 204
S.E.2d 612 (Ga. 1974), the death penalty for rape was vacated as rarely imposed. The court
reviewed eleven cases, five of which resulted in the imposition of the death penalty. Yet
soon afterwards, in Eberhart v. State, 206 S.E.2d 12 (Ga. 1974), the court upheld a capital
sentence for rape.
Thus, this review process which the U.S. Supreme Court felt would keep a check on arbi-
trary jury action and insure uniformity in sentencing may not be achieving the desired re-
sult.
204. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 303; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 333.
205. 391 U.S. 510 (1967).
206. Culpability requires a showing of mens rea and establishes the degree of moral
blameworthiness. Angel, supra note 24, at 76-80.
207. This might be true even if the crime involved the murder of a police officer as in
Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636-37 (1977) (per curiam).
208. Angel, supra note 24, at 133.
209. Tribe, supra note 127.
210. Id at 286.
211. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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ment," 212 as was implicit in Gregg. Rather, the Court determined the
penalty to be "disproportional," both relatively and absolutely, and
therefore "excessive." First, the penalty allowed a death sentence for
an offense when the victim survived, yet it permitted mere imprison-
ment when the victim died. In Georgia, as in all other states, 213 a first-
degree murderer may receive a sentence of imprisonment rather than
death even when the homicide is attendant with aggravating circum-
stances. To execute a rapist, when he has not killed his victim, would
result in relative disproportionality among sentences. Implicit in this
holding214 is the notion that the offense of rape is never as morally
evil215 as murder. It also suggests that no non-homicide crime may be
punished with the death sentence, particularly in light of Justice
White's observation that "Short of homicide, [rape] is the 'ultimate vio-
lation of self."'2 16 Apparently, other crimes which once warranted exe-
cution may now be punishable only by lesser sentences.217 This
attribute of the moral judgment expressed in Coker caused Justice
Powell to dissent, in part, because he could not accede to such "a bright
line between murder and all rapes-regardless of the degree of brutal-
ity of the rape or the effect upon the victim.
218
The other aspect of disproportionality in Coker, that of absolute dis-
proportionality, was the basis for the widespread legislative rejection of
the death penalty for rape.21 9 At the time of the decision, Georgia was
apparently the only jurisdiction in the United States which validly au-
thorized capital punishment for rape of an adult woman.220 Further-
more, only about ten percent of rape convictions in Georgia since 1973
had resulted in death sentences.221 Thus, at least two of the crucial
212. Id at 592-93.
213. See the mandatory death penalty cases, notes 188-210 supra and accompanying text.
214. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 600.
215. For an analysis of moral wickedness, see H. HART, supra note 141, at 230-37.
216. 433 U.S. at 597.
217. For example, robbery and kidnapping can be punished only by sentences lesser than
death. See Gregg v. State, 210 S.E.2d 659 (Ga. 1974). Former Justice Goldberg, relying on
Weems, advocated this result. Goldberg, The Death Penalty and the Supreme Court, 15
AIuz. L. REv. 355, 364 (1973).
218. 433 U.S. at 603.
219. Id at 594-96.
220. North Carolina and Louisiana had also sought to impose the death penalty for rape,
but their mandatory sentencing laws were held unconstitutional in Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). However, as Chief
Justice Burger correctly notes, even an unconstitutional statute may be reflective of public
opinion. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 613.
221. 433 U.S. at 596-97.
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indicators of "standards of decency," legislative enactments and jury
action, pointed away from capital sentencing in rape cases. The Court
concluded, therefore, that this sentence was disproportional to the se-
verity of the crime as perceived by prevailing public attitudes.
The death penalty in Coker was found absolutely disporportional
because popular sentiment abhorred it.222 Consequently, absolute pro-
portionality was a function of the state of public morality:
The strongest evidence that a punishment is disproportionate to a crime
is evidence of public antipathy for the punishment in general or for its
application to a particular crime .... If juries were regularly refusing to
convict men of a particular crime when cognizant of the statutory punish-
ment, it would be absurd to contend that the punishment is proportional
to the crime.22
However, the "popular sentiment" analysis does not exhaust the pro-
portionality principle. A punishment may be disproportional in spite
of public acceptance. 224 Even the dissenters in Coker seemingly ac-
cepted an eighth amendment proportionality bar to the death penalty
for minor crimes225 without subsuming it to a popularity test.226 For
the Justices to acknowledge that disproportionality might be proven in
ways other than by demonstrating public abhorance inevitably em-
broils the Court in subjective analyses. At the very least, the line be-
tween major and minor crimes requires subjective delineation itself.227
To avoid this, the plurality in Coker stated that their own judgments,
which were far from irrelevant, were supported by legislative rejection
of capital punishment for rape.228
Coker clearly establishes the distinction between deferring to a par-
ticular legislative penalty scheme and deference to attitudes on punish-
ment extant in the society as a whole.229 But what once seemed classic
deference, pursuant to notions of federalism and institutional compe-
tence, has given way to consensual deference. For instance, in Gregg,
222. See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 332 (1972).
223. Wheeler-IL, supra note 34, at 64.
224. Id
225. 433 U.S. at 604.
226. In his Senate confirmation hearings, Justice Blackmun posed a hypothetical jaywalk-
ing statute carrying the death penalty; a statute which a court would have to strike down on
independent proportionality grounds. Hearings of the Senate Judiciary Committee on Nomi-
nation of Harry L Blackmun to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1970).
227. Coker, 433 U.S. at 619-21. It would appear that to the dissenters in Coker, once any
legislature has established capital punishment for a crime, it is placed outside the category of
preposterous punishments requiring a proportionality analysis. Id
228. Id at 597.
229. See notes 84 & 85 supra and accompanying text.
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Justice Stewart deferred to the Georgia Legislature on the issues of de-
terrence and moral standards: "The value of capital punishment as a
deterrent of crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of which
properly rests with the legislatures, which can evaluate the results of
statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions ... ."3o Yet, in
Coker, Justice White, with Justice Stewart joining, discounted the pos-
sible deterrent effect of execution for rape by basing the decision on
proportionality grounds.z3'
Far more important, however, is the retreat from the judicial method
which allows each state to assess its own moral standards.232 The Court
in Gregg emphasized "respect for the ability of a legislature to evaluate,
in terms of its particular State, the moral consensus concerning the
death penalty and its social utility as a sanction . . 2. 3 Coker cer-
tainly expands the field for determination of social mores to the nation
as a whole.2 34 The Supreme Court has said that standards of decency
in Georgia have not "evolved" to the level of the rest of the country
nor, perhaps, to the rest of the civilized world.
2 35
The Court's role in proportionality assessment seems greater after
Coker. For example, in Furman, Justice Powell suggested that the con-
stitutional requirement of proportionality would only authorize the
Court to strike down punishments as excessive in extraordinary
cases.236 Coker seemed to signal an expanded role for the Court, or at
least a stricter interpretation of the proportionality requirement. The
capital punishment methodology which prevailed in Coker was more
in line with the early eighth amendment decisions than were the other
recent capital cases. Coker establishes that standards of punishment
are not tied to historical use. The death penalty for rape was widely
authorized at one time but is now rejected through an evolution of
moral standards. This suggests a progressive relaxation of punish-
230. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 186 (emphasis added).
231. 433 U.S. at 592 & nA.
232. See Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Coker: "[T]he deference we owe to decisions of
the state legislature under our federal system . . . is enhanced where the specification of
punishments is concerned, for 'these arepeculiary questions of legiative policy."' 433 U.S.
at 613 n.8 (emphasis in original).
233. 428 U.S. at 186-87.
234. Consequently, analysis of contemporary social values under the eighth amendment
differs from such analysis under the first amendment in obscenity cases, where local stand-
ards of morality are deemed the controlling factor. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157
(1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The better rule is to establish a national
standard in all such areas. Perry, supra note 40, at 732 n.201.
235. The plurality opinion in Coker notes that international sentiment was against capital
punishment for rape. 433 U.S. at 596 n.201.
236. 408 U.S. at 458. See also note 226 supra.
1978]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWEVIEW
ments, precisely the principle the framers intended with the eighth
amendment.237
X. MITIGATING FACTORS: LOCKETT V. OHIO
The uncertain requirements of the eighth amendment which evolved
from the nine separate opinions in Furman have recently caused yet
another sentencing scheme to come under constitutional scrutiny. In
Lockett v. Ohio238 and Bell v. Ohio,239 the Supreme Court overturned
Ohio's death penalty on the ground that certain mitigating factors
could not be introduced by the defendant.
[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that
the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital cases, not be precluded
from considering as a miligatingfactor, any aspect of defendant's charac-
ter or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defend-
ant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.240
In the leading case, Sandra Lockett, a twenty year old woman, was
an accomplice to an armed robbery24 in which a shopkeeper was ac-
cidently shot. She was the driver of the getaway car and took no part in
the actual killing. Her participation was described as minimal,2 42 but
she was found vicariously liable under Ohio's complicity statute.243
The man who did the actual killing pleaded guilty to murder and be-
came the state's principal witness against Lockett. The state then re-
duced charges against him, thereby removing the possibility of his
receiving the death penalty. Lockett refused three offers to plead guilty
to lesser offenses and was subsequently convicted of murder with ag-
gravating circumstances and sentenced to death.
237. This raises the question of whether standards of decency may regress, or whether the
eighth amendment permits only a liberalization of punishments. It would seem very difficult
for the Supreme Court to ever authorize a reinstatement of a penalty once prohibited on the
grounds of "cruel and unusual." The plurality in Gregg suggests that a ruling of unconstitu-
tionality under the eighth amendment could never be reversed short of constitutional
amendment. 428 U.S. at 176. This is probably true, but it is suggested elsewhere that only
that level of public support sufficient to result in a constitutional amendment is relevant in
determining public sentiment. See note 111 supra and accompanying text. But see note 203
supra.
238. 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978).
239. 98 S. Ct. 2977 (1978).
240. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. at 2965 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).
241. The gun was actually obtained from the pawn shop owner under the pretext of a
purchase. 1d at 2957.
242. The presentence report indicated that "Lockett had not followed [orders] to keep the
car running during the robbery and instead had gone to get something to eat." Id at 2959
n.2.
243. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.03(A),(F) (Page 1975).
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The Ohio sentencing statute required the trial judge to impose a
judgment of death after a verdict of "aggravated murder with specifica-
tions," unless at least one of three mitigating circumstances were found:
provocation by the victim, coercion, or mental deficiency.'" The de-
fendant was unable to introduce evidence on his or her character,
youthfulness, previous record, degree of participation in the crime, or
other individualizing criteria.
Justices White and Rehnquist, in separate opinions, viewed the case
as a complete "about-face"245 from Furman. Lockett returned to the
jury the discretion to consider any relevant mitigating factor.246 To
avoid conflict with Furman, the Court stressed that this discretion must
be "directed and limited," but not eliminated.247
Despite Chief Justice Burger's efforts in the plurality opinion to fully
reconcile Lockett with Furman and the mandatory cases, there is no
real consistency. Three Justices, Stewart, White, and Douglas, used an
analytic attack in Furman to void capital statutes then existing, stating
that eighth amendment due process surely was being frustrated by in-
herently discriminatory death sentences. Only Justice Stewart, one of
the eight sitting in Furman and Lockett, could find similar procedural
deficiencies in both these cases.248
Lockett marks a mere seven years of eighth amendment death pen-
alty challenges. It is a disguised exercise of stricter judicial review of
capital legislation. The Court has recognized that the legislatures are
not acting within the constitutional standards which they themselves
have partly defined as a result of the Court's judicial deference.
The various analyses employed by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun and White reflect disappointment with legislative responsi-
bility. The Chief Justice's plurality opinion considered the Ohio sen-
tencing scheme an extension of the mandatory legislation previously
ruled unconstitutional.249 Thus, the requirement for individualization
in capital cases was only partially realized by a statute which precluded
many types of mitigating circumstances. Lockett's death sentence may
have been disproportional to her offense because it failed to consider
244. Id § 2929.03.
245. 98 S. Ct. at 2982 (1978) (White J., dissenting in part). Justice Rehnquist felt the
Court had "gone from pillar to post." Id at 2973 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
246. Id at 2967.
247. Id at 2963 (relying on Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
248. Justice Brennan did not participate in Lockett, but his view is well settled and there
is nothing to suggest any shift in his position here. Justice Douglas has been replaced by
Justice Stevens.
249. See text accompanying notes 188-98 supra.
1978]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [
her intent and minimum participation in the crime.250
Surely every capital defendant could proffer mitigating evidence of
some sort, even one for whom mandatory sentences may still be consti-
tutional 1.2 - Nonetheless, only that evidence which is legally relevant
would be permissible. This might yield a boot-strapping process. Pur-
suant to Lockett the jury must consider all evidence relevant to assess-
ment of the appropriate penalty. But the legislature, prior to Lockett,
defined the terms of relevancy. Thus, Lockett requires complete sen-
tencing discretion where capital punishment is validly authorized, per-
haps limited only by notions of equal protection. Justice Rehnquist
accurately described the inevitable effect. "[T]he new constitutional
doctrine will not eliminate arbitrariness or freakishness in the imposi-
tion of sentences, but will codify and institutionalize it."' 252 This does
not undermine the result in Lockett; instead it again demonstrates that
arbitrariness is inherent in capital sentencing. 3
Justice Blackmun voted to reverse for two reasons. First, he felt that
the sentencing body was constitutionally required to consider the de-
fendant's involvement, "or the degree of her mens rea.' '254 But he was
not as yet willing to require consideration of other types of mitigating
evidence. Justice Blackmun could not draw "a convincing bright-line"
with respect to vicarious liability, as had been done in rape cases, 25 so
as to preclude the death penalty for felony murder altogether. Instead,
he adopted "a proceduralist tack, '25 6 an approach he felt would inter-
fere less severely with the legislatures' discretion. But by rejecting a
proportionality analysis and adopting an analytic approach, Justice
Blackmun may have opened the door for greater judicial participation
in sentencing standards than he had previously stated was desirable.
This ground for reversal is certainly contrary to his vote in the
mandatory cases following Gregg.2 7 He may have felt compelled to
reach this result due to the unconscionable nature of this case. But the
250. The plurality opinion reserved judgment on the validity of capital punishment for
vicarious liability. But see Justice Whites concurring opinion in text accompanying notes
262-65 infra.
251. The Supreme Court has specifically avoided ruling on whether mandatory death
sentences are constitutional in cases such as murder committed by an escaped prisoner
under life sentence. Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 n.5 (1977) (per curiam).
252. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. at 2975.
253. H. BEDAU, supra note 75.
254. 98 S. Ct. at 2969.
255. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
256. 98 S. Ct. at 2970.
257. Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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limits Justice Blackmun imposes here are devoid of standards and thus
are not capable of application elsewhere. For example, he does not
explain why the degrees of participation and mens rea are crucial miti-
gating criteria while other elements of defendant's character might not
be. If Justice Blackmun intends to "interfere with the legislative judg-
ment of the States"2 58 only on a case-by-case basis, he certainly em-
broils the Court in greater subjective review of death penalty legislation
and provides lesser guidance for the constitutional exercise of legisla-
tive discretion.
Justice Blackmun's second stated ground for reversal was the uncon-
stitutional burden placed upon the defendant's sixth amendment right
to jury trial and fifth amendment right to plead not guilty. 59 "Under
Ohio Rule Crim. Proc. 1 l(C)(4), the sentencing court has full discretion
to prevent imposition of a capital sentence 'in the interests of justice' if
a defendant pleads guilty or no contest, but wholly lacks such discre-
tion if the defendant goes to trial."26
Thus, Justice Blackmun employed an analytic approach in arriving
at both of his objections in Lockett. This avoids direct confrontation
with legislative discretion in a particular case, as does procedural due
process methodology in general.2 61 But the net effect seems contrary to
Justice Blackmun's earlier highly deferential approach.
Justice White dissented from the plurality opinion but concurred in
the judgment. He adhered to his view that mandatory sentencing does
not violate the eighth amendment2 62 and forecast a "return to the pre-
Furman days when the death penalty was generally reserved for those
very few for whom society has least consideration. 2 63 Nonetheless, he
voted to reverse on the ground that a death sentence for homicide not
purposefully caused was excessive. Justice White found the death sen-
tence disproportional because its infrequent application prevented it
from furthering the goals of punishment:2 4 "It is clear from recent
history that the infliction of death under circumstances where there is
258. 98 S. Ct. at 2970.
259. Id (citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968)).
260. Id at 2971.
261. See Angel, supra note 24, at 65; Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 26, at 1800
("The assumption seems to be that it is more appropriate for the Court to invoke the Consti-
tution to interfere with a government's choice of procedures than to interfere with its enact-
ment of substantive criminal law.").
262. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 349 (1977) (White, J., dissenting). Roberts also
involved the felony-murder rule.
263. 98 S. Ct. at 2983.
264. Of the 362 executions since 1954 that Justice White surveyed, he found that only
eight "clearly involved individuals who did not personally commit the murder." Id at 2983.
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no purpose to take life has been widely rejected as grossly out of pro-
portion to the seriousness of the crime.
' '2 65
This analysis is facially consistent with his opinion in Furman, where
he found that arbitrary and infrequent imposition of death sentences
failed to satisfy legitimate state goals. But in Furman, it was not the
infrequency of imposition alone that raised eighth amendment
problems,266 it was the legislative acquiescence in that practice which
indicated that executions were unnecessary to fulfill the legislatures'
stated purposes.267
What seems to emerge as Justice White's primary objection to the
Ohio scheme is the lack of value that capital punishment has in cases of
unintentional homicide. Capital punishment in such cases is unneces-
sary and excessive because its deterrent effect is "extremely attenu-
ated. 268 Justice White stated that, "Whatever questions may be raised
concerning the efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrent to intentional
murders - and that debate rages on - its function in deterring individu-
als from becoming involved in ventures in which death may uninten-
tionally result is even more doubtful. '2 69  This analysis seems
intuitively correct.27 However, a rule turning on the intention of the
defendant creates definitional issues which the rest of the Court was
unwilling to share.271 It also suggests that the death penalty would be
unconstitutionally severe as to any other class of murder where the de-
terrent effect on the defendant is minimal.272
A separate ground for vacating petitioner's death sentence was
passed over by the Court. Petitioner had challenged the validity of her
conviction on the ground that four veniremen who had revealed
scruples against the death penalty were excused for cause in violation
of Witherspoon v. Illinois.273 The Supreme Court dismissed this chal-
lenge because "nothing in [Witherspoon] prevented the execution of a
265. Id at 2983-84.
266. Indeed, there Justice White stated that proportionality requirements are not neces-
sarily violated "no matter how infrequently those convicted of rape or murder are executed
...." Furmanv. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 311.
267. Id at 314. Those legislatures responding to Furman with mandatory sentencing
manifested a state purpose (deterrence and retribution) which could only be satisfied by
consistent imposition of death sentences.
268. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. at 2984.
269. Id
270. Justice White previously used intuition in setting constitutional standards in
Furman, but there he used it to show that capital punishment was not per se unconstitu-
tional. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
271. 98 S. Ct. at 2970 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
272. See note 115 supra.
273. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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death sentence when the veniremen excluded for cause make it 'unmis-
takably clear. . . that their attitude toward the death penalty would
prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's
guilt.' "274 The Ohio sentencing scheme vested the trial judge, not the
jury, with responsibility to decide upon death or a lesser sentence.
Consequently, the only way that a juror who found the death sentence
reprehensible could contribute his "standard of decency" would be to
vote for acquittal in spite of the "law and instruction of the trial
judge.
275
If Ohio had a properly constituted capital statute which afforded the
jury "directed and limited"2 76 sentencing discretion, the four excluded
jurors could have conscientiously joined the venire; in that case, their
exclusion would have directly violated Witherspoon. As a result, Lock-
ett almost certainly would have received a life sentence instead of
death.
The holdings of Lockett and Witherspoon, when read together, sug-
gest that the principles of discretion require jury sentencing in all cases.
Lockett also seems to severely limit Proffltt v. Florida277 and Jurek v.
Texas,278 companion cases to Gregg. In Proffitt, the Supreme Court
upheld a sentencing scheme which allowed the jury to consider only
limited, enumerated mitigating circumstances. However, the Court
construed the sentencing statute to allow any relevant mitigating evi-
dence.279 On the other hand, the statute found acceptable in Jurek
looks very much like the one recently rejected in Lockett.280 Now, evi-
dently, the Supreme Court is not as willing to accept state courts' inter-
pretations as a cure for capital statutes with limited or enumerated
mitigating factors.
XI. CONCLUSION
Eighth amendment challenges to the death penalty have an inconsis-
tent history and a more uncertain future. In this decade the Supreme
274. 98 S. Ct. at 2960 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)).
275. Id The Court understandably disapproves of such action in Lockett but has ac-
knowledged the relevance of jury nullification as an indicator of evolving standards. See
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (jury decision useful in assessing whehter capital
punishment is appropriate in a particular case).
276. 98 S. Ct. at 2963.
277. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
278. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
279. 428 U.S. at 257-58.
280. 428 U.S. at 269.
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Court has meandered through six major attempts at enunciating stand-
ards for capital punishment. The several disparate attitudes toward ju-
dicial review in general and the nontextually based constitutional
guarantee of humane punishments in particular have rendered a coher-
ent and consistent standard difficult to obtain.
Prior to Furman v. Georgia, there had not been an elaborate field of
eighth amendment decisions upon which the Court could build a prin-
cipled approach to sentencing standards. The two major cases which
attempted to set standards for "cruel and unusual"281 involved lesser
punishments than death and had assumed, arguendo, the constitution-
ality of capital punishment. The Framer's command for humane pun-
ishments was so elusive that few Supreme Court Justices have been
willing to directly establish or define eighth amendment standards.
In McGuatha v. Caifornia, the first of the modem-day capital cases,
the Court found standardless capital sentencing procedures consistent
with due process. Soon thereafter, in Furman, three Justices avoided
an otherwise direct eighth amendment challenge to the death penalty
by again focusing on sentencing procedures. In Gregg v. Georgia, a
majority of the Supreme Court, for the first time, addressed the validity
.of a judgment of death under the eighth amendment.
The approach which has emerged from these cases places the Court
in a reduced role of constitutional interpretation. The opinions have
displayed judicial reticence in directly defining a prohibition which in-
evitably must find standards outside of the Constitution. Using the
"evolving standards of decency" to determine the meaning of "cruel
and unusual" insures that no punishment which is clearly repugnant to
the overwhelming portion of society will survive. But by tying the con-
stitutional norm to elusive social values, the Court has institutionalized
a great and devisive controversy. Democratic majoritarianism is pre-
served by the Court's professed deference; but it is preserved in an area
where the Court has historically been less inclined to accept legislative
determinations.
By borrowing the scope of judicial review employed in the equal pro-
tection area, which is not foreign to the jurisprudence involved here,282
the Court could reasonably require a greater showing of governmental
need for the death penalty. The burden of proof regarding the utility of
a punishment should rest with the state where fundamental constitu-
281. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
282. Note, Gregg v. Georgia, Proffitt v. Florida, and Jurek v. Texas: Burden of Proof in
Capital Cases Past, Present, and Future, 6 CAP. U.L. REv. 155, 157 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Burden of Proot]. See also notes 23 & 115 supra.
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tional rights are concerned. However, the Supreme Court has never
held that the right not to be executed is fundamental for eighth amend-
ment purposes. To be sure, no one may be deprived of life without due
process of law; therefore, the right to life is fundamental for fifth and
fourteenth amendment due process purposes. But the fundamental
right protected in the eighth amendment is the right to suffer no cruel
and unusual punishments. Thus, penalty legislation is entitled to the
same presumption of validity as other areas of economic and social
regulation. Only when a penalty is determined to be "cruel and unu-
sual" must a state show a special need for its exaction.
283
It is certainly not accurate to accuse the Court of employing a boot-
strapping anaysis-that the mere existence of a death statute is evi-
dence of the constitutionality of capital punishment-for sentences
have been stricken notwithstanding this deference. Yet in the eighth
amendment area, the Court employs a mode of analysis with few con-
temporary counterparts.
The presumed deterrent effect of capital punishment is essential to its
continued validity; contemporary standards of decency would seem-
ingly eschew any severe punishment without superior social effect. Yet
the objective indicia of social morality which define "cruel and unu-
sual" punishments do not appear to take this factor into serious consid-
eration. Furthermore, the battle of statistics between abolitionists and
proponents was generated primarily in response to judicial inquiry, not
because of legislative or popular demands.
284
In Furman and Gregg, most members of the Court felt it inappropri-
ate to assume a supervisory role in a field wrought with uncertainty and
base emotion. Perhaps, if public and political trends in the 1970's had
shown a liberalization of attitudes toward criminal punishment rather
than a constriction, the Court might have displayed greater ethical
leadership as it did in the abortion cases. But in Roe v. Wade, the
Court seemingly responded to public morality by striking down restric-
tive state statutes. A similar effect in Furman or Gregg would have to
have been based on a more independent concept of judicial review.
The cases following Gregg, including two of the mandatory cases de-
cided the same day,285 provided the Court with a greater opportunity to
define eighth amendment standards while leaving the state legislatures
considerable discretion. These cases also evince an increased judicial
leadership in setting ethical standards. This article has suggested that
283. But see Burden of Proof, supra note 282.
284. See note 163 supra and accompanying text.
285. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976). See part VIII, supra.
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the Court should assume such a role, even to the extent of establishing
first moral principles. The closest the Court has come to such princi-
pled rule making is in Coker v. Georgia, suggesting that non-homicide
crimes may not be punished by death. But cases such as Lockett V.
Ohio reinforce the need for further leadership.
In Lockett, the Court strained adherence to its narrow exceptions in
eighth amendment adjudication. The plurality merely conceptualized
the case as a peculiar form of mandatory legislation previously found
unconstitutional. However, the Court did not, in fact, determine that
contemporary notions of public decency abhored a statute limiting mit-
igating factors for consideration in sentencing. What it did determine
was that the death penalty for Sandra Lockett was plainly repugnant to
maturing moral standards. That determination was made because exe-
cuting Lockett would shock the conscience of virtually every member
of the Court. In this respect, the Court's decision bears surprising re-
semblance to the earlier approaches of Justices Marshall and Brennan.
However, the approach apparently taken in Lockett could be expanded
beyond its current ad hoc application. When eight members2 6 of the
Supreme Court are disturbed by a capital sentence, their vacating that
sentence fulfills the intention of the eighth amendment proscriptions of
inhumane punishments.
286. Justice Rehnquist was the only member of the Court voting to affirm the judgment of
death in Loekeit, 98 S. Ct. at 2973, and has voted for affirmance in each capital case. Justice
Brennan did not participate in Lockelt, but has expressed his view that the death penalty is
unconstitutional per se. See note 248 supra.
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